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Abstract 
This thesis explores the question of standardization in the First World War Canadian 
Army Medical Corps ideologies and procedures through a case study of fifty soldiers 
discharged for being medically unfit. In analyzing their service records, this thesis 
demonstrates that there was generalized diagnosis, treatment, and common experiences for 
Canadian soldiers being treated for mental health afflictions in the First World War.  
However, because of different medical ideologies, scientific-based beliefs in how humanity 
was hierarchically organized, the influence of class and rank, the impact of the opposing 
fields of neurology and psychology, and the need for military efficiency over individual 
wellness there were not and could not have been standardized practices in the medical field 
during the First World War.  
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Summary for Lay Audience 
In this research project, the treatment of mental health in First World War Canadian 
soldiers will be examined to better understand the experience on the ground of being 
diagnosed with a psychological affliction after the turn of the century. Through the service 
records of fifty soldiers, this thesis will demonstrate that soldiers with shell shock, 
neurasthenia, or other mental health affectations were not treated in a standardized system 
of care, but in a reactive system of care that was focused on maintaining unit strength and 
returning sick soldiers to the front as soon as possible. Different hospitals with different 
physicians held opposing beliefs about the cause of shell shock and other mental illnesses, 
and therefore how to treat them. Neurologists believed it was the result of physical lesions 
or an injury to the nervous system. Psychologists believed that mental illness was the 
physical manifestation of a mental weakness and strove to determine the genetic, 
intellectual, or individual weaknesses that resulted in this mental breakdown.   
Rank and class affect how a soldier was diagnosed and treated. Officers were given the 
opportunity to take more time off the front to recuperate in private convalescent centers run 
by British elites and offering state-of-the-art treatments like electrotherapy. They were also 
more likely to be sent back to Canada for extended periods of time without having to be 
discharged from service. Physicians, who were officers, were noted as feeling more 
comfortable around fellow officers and could therefore perform better. That soldiers 
experienced different levels of care based on their class and their rank is indicative of a 
system of preferential treatment that could not have been standardized medically.  
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Introduction 
Private Charles Stevens was a 24-year-old London, England-born chimney sweep 
married to Florence and together they had two children. On 13 December 1915, he enlisted in 
the 72nd Canadian Infantry Battalion in Saskatoon, Saskatchewan. Two years later, he was 
admitted to No. 4 Stationary Hospital in Arques, France for “NYD [Not Yet Diagnosed] 
Shell Shock” after a shell exploded near him at Vimy Ridge and knocked him unconscious.1 
After allowing him time to convalesce, his physicians considered him cured of shell shock 
and neurasthenia and discharged him from hospital. However, on 2 June 1917, he “had a 
hysterical fit,” fell, and hit the back of his head on stone.2 As a result, Pte Stevens would 
spend 1917 in and out of hospitals and convalescent stations for shell shock, neurasthenia, 
hysteria, convulsive delirium, mental observation, and general weakness as his doctors tried 
to get at the heart of what caused his seizures,  and determined if he could be rehabilitated 
and returned to the front.3  
A handwritten note dated July 1917 in his file indicated that Pte Stevens had confessed 
to murdering his wife and children while on leave in England.  
I said I was fit, but she kept on saying that I was not fit I said I was going back to 
camp, but she kept on saying I was not fit and should not be in the army and she said, 
‘why don’t you come home?’ I said I was going back to camp, but she kept on saying I 
was not fit and then she tried to prevent me from going by taking hold of me and in the 
struggle, I killed my wife and my two children.”4   
 
1 Library and Archives Canada, Personnel Records of the First World War, “Stevens, Charles.” RG 150, 
Accession 1992-93/166, Box 9283 - 5, Item Number 250672 Regimental Number 472815.   
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid. 
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A second handwritten note appeared in his file a few months later in November 1917, 
after he had been discharged back to Canada, from the Saskatchewan Military Hospital that 
read 
Stephens does not remember making any such statements or signing any such 
confession. At present time – his wife and children are residing in Saskatoon. He is 
living with them and getting along well… His family have never been in England.5 
Physicians looked at his medical and family histories for clues. His father, it was discovered, 
had died in an asylum; there was family history of insanity. It was also uncovered that Pte 
Stevens had seizures in his childhood and at the age of. His childhood seizures were relevant, 
but military physicians concluded that the seizures he had experienced at nineteen were been 
brought on by alcoholism, something he struggled with while in the military.  
Stevens was moved between three military hospitals from 23 May 1917 to 28 
September 1917 before a medical board determined that he would be discharged back to 
Canada for treatment in October of 1917: first, the 2nd Western General Hospital in 
Manchester where he was admitted for neurasthenia for 23 days; second, the Canadian 
Stationary Hospital in Epsom where he was admitted for neurasthenia and general weakness 
for 16 days; and third, the Canadian Military Hospital in Eastbourne where he was admitted 
for hysteria for 71 days. Here, it was determined that he was to be transferred to the Canadian 
Military Hospital in Liverpool from which he could be invalidated back to Canada. Because 
his seizures were the most overt symptoms of his illness, doctors focused on healing them 
and his shakiness and therefore diagnosed him with hysteria and shell shock; the haphazard 
note of “delirium” written earlier on in his file called no attention as those symptoms. With 
 
5 Ibid. 
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his discharge back to Canada, his medical board determined that he would be able to return 
to civilian life and his work as a chimney sweep in Canada, but only after he received further 
treatment in Saskatchewan at a convalescent hospital. On 28 October 1917 his medical board 
met and confirmed that he should be discharged back to Canada. 
The First World War brought a critical shift in the history of psychiatry as the sheer 
number of soldiers afflicted with shell shock necessitated improved hospital systems, care, 
and the revitalization and modernization of conceptions of mental health diseases, ailments, 
and illnesses.  Tim Cook notes that official records list “at least 9000 Canadians were 
diagnosed with shell shock,” and one wartime physician suggested that the number should be 
at least 15,000.6 Ben Shepherd notes that, although the records do not provide complete 
numerical data, 16,000 soldiers were diagnosed with shell shock in British hospitals in 1916 
alone, the numbers rising dramatically during large engagements such as the Somme 
offensive.7 The experience of shell shock in the First World War is a poignant and popular 
historical relationship to explore because it permits historians to superimpose the microcosm 
of the individual experience in battle onto the macrocosm of important tactical decisions 
made in First World War operational warfare; a soldier’s health was an individual experience 
and yet its organization and treatment was carried out through interconnected military 
institutions. War forced mental health from scientific ambiguity to the forefront of medical, 
 
6 Cook, Tim. Shock Troops: Canadians Fighting the Great War, 1917-1918. (Toronto: Viking Canada, 2008). 
243. 
7 Shephard, Ben. A War of Nerves: Soldiers and Psychiatrists in the Twentieth. (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard 
University Press, 2001). 41. 
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military, and home-front realities; it demanded it be dealt with because it impaired the Allied 
forces’ ability to wage war. 
This thesis will explore the experiences of fifty soldiers discharged as medically unfit 
due to psychological afflictions. The purpose of this case study will be to use examples from 
points across the war, the continent of Europe, ages, ranks, and illness type to demonstrate 
that there were not standardized treatments of care for soldiers discharged for being 
psychologically impaired. This can be observed in inconsistent treatment methods and the 
reasons behind them, the hospitals to which the soldiers were admitted, how and when they 
were discharged, what they were diagnosed with, and the length of time they spent on and off 
the front. The differentiation of treatment and a lack of medical consistency will be the 
primary focus of this research that, ultimately, will contribute to a better understanding of the 
development of mental health treatments in Canada.  
Historiography: 
The historiography on the subject of Canadian soldiers diagnosed with and/or 
discharged for being medically unfit for psychological impairment is substantial. Historians 
have explored shell shock as another facet of the debilitating medical experience of war. A 
number of studies looked at shell shock in the Second World War, followed closely by 
comparative works of the two world wars.8 Revisionists have tackled psychological injury in 
war, revisiting the numbers to suggest that the afflicted could not actually be quantified.9 If 
 
8 Shepherd, A War of Nerves; Copp, J. T., and Bill McAndrew. Battle: Soldiers and Psychiatrists in the 
Canadian Army, 1939-1945. (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1990). 
9 Copp, Terry, and Mark Osborne Humphries. Combat Stress in the 20th Century: The Commonwealth 
Perspective. (Kingston, Ontario: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2010). 
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latent symptoms arose years later, were they not still due to wartime conditions? Were all 
reported wartime conditions the result of genuine experience of psychological distress? If 
psychological distress was not reported, was it pertinent to include their experience? How did 
class play into the diagnosis or lack of diagnosis in soldiers? 
In recent years, authors have moved from an analysis of what shell shock was and how 
it emerged to what it meant to the war effort. Tim Cook and Mark Osborne Humphries have 
explored the experiences of these men in Shock Troops: Canadians Fighting the Great War 
and A Weary Road: Shell Shock in the Canadian Expeditionary Force. In Cook’s Shock 
Troops, he discusses how shell shock was initially considered a physical ailment resulting 
from reverberations and atmospheric changes caused by shells exploding near the body.10 At 
the beginning of the war, men who were on the front lines and near exploding shells were the 
most common victims diagnosed with shell shock. However, as the war continued, only men 
who were close to shell accidents or involved in them were permitted to be diagnosed with 
shell shock by military medical officers. As men far from any shellfire or explosions were 
presenting with similar symptoms to men diagnosed with shell shock, it became apparent that 
something other than shock waves had to be behind what doctors were calling shell shock: 
“Prolonged exposure to stress was the culprit, and without rest or respite from the strain of 
war, most soldiers inevitably developed some form of this nervous disorder.”11 According to 
Cook, there was no one common symptom experienced by all those afflicted with shellshock. 
However, “for most men the effect began gradually and gained progressively in intensity.”12 
 
10 Cook, Shock Troops, 241. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. 
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Shock Troops examines how the men’s and their physicians’ understanding of shell shock 
changed over the course of the war. The variety in visible or notable symptoms is one of the 
reasons why standardization would have been so difficult; if men were presenting with 
different symptoms and physicians were not capable of discerning a common cause, the 
culprit would initially be determined to be different entities. Instead, the military opted for a 
general approach that could best tackle as many symptoms at once as possible. 
Mark Osborne Humphries’ A Weary Road looks at shell shock and asks questions 
about what it meant to the Canadian soldiers and how that affected the war effort more 
broadly. How did the large numbers of men afflicted with psychological issues affect the 
fighting units at the front? Did treatment differ from colonial to imperial soldiers? Humphries 
takes an expanded view of psychology, suggesting that shell shock was not simply a 
symptom of war, although its presence and treatment did become a determining factor in the 
outcome of war efforts. Whereas the historiography tends to characterize shell shock as 
byproduct of war, Humphries includes it as an active and determinist participant. He does 
this by framing military organization of medical treatment as a reactive institution that had to 
accommodate mass numbers of soldiers in hospitals with shell shock and other psychological 
disorders while simultaneously maintaining strength at the front.  
Sir Andrew Macphail’s 1925 book History of the Canadian Forces, 1914-1919: 
Medical Services explores the construction, experience, and realities facing the Canadian 
medical services during the First World War. Specifically, he highlights the experiences of a 
medical division dedicated to improving the health of soldiers while also serving the higher 
need of maintaining military strength on the front. It becomes clear that he wants readers to 
understand that the Canadian Army Medical Corps, or CAMC, operated under a system of 
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triage and rehabilitation in war that did not constitute a classical hospital rest-recuperate 
environment. Instead, it was an institution established to maintain military strength rather 
than to support individual lives. In pulling back from the individual experience, this book 
helps bring the historian out of the individual in the case files to the administration and 
realities of the war. This theme was taken up and expanded on by historian Richard Holt in 
his book Filling the Ranks: Manpower in the Canadian Expeditionary Force. Holt analyses 
the evolution of the Canadian Expeditionary Force, or the CEF, from a militia to a 
professional army, the main impediment to that process being establishing and maintain the 
manpower as well as the institutions to support that military system.  Holt looks at the use of 
command depots to rehabilitate soldiers outside convalescent and general hospitals as a 
means of freeing up space, the Bruce Report and the government’s response to an 
investigation that concluded the CAMC resources were being squandered by the British 
Empire, and the experiences of physicians and patients in the war. Holt takes a step away 
from the war front to look at its administration. The army was organized around acquiring 
and sustaining manpower and that had an influence on the medical treatment of soldiers as 
they were a resource to be reused as opposed to wasted. The dichotomy between medicine 
and the military, and the way the needs of one affected the other, permitted me to construct 
arguments around the problems associated with hospitalizing men who presented with mental 
illness in wartime. 
Other historians move out of the First World War and into the Second, to compare and 
contrast them and to assess the evolution of medicine over that time. Ben Shepherd’s A War 
of Nerves is an amalgamation of in-depth analyses about the experiences of the soldiers and 
their physicians over the 20th century, from 1914-1994. Shepherd examines shell shock and 
other nervous disorders that were rampant during the First World War, looking at the 
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soldier’s experience and what the physicians brought to that relationship.  He stresses that 
physicians were not neutral bodies acting outside of military needs, hospital needs, and their 
own ideological convictions. Shepherd analyses the evolution of different medical practices, 
military procedures, and the subsequent shifts in soldier treatment. He places the physicians’ 
decisions to expand and restrict definitions of nervous disorders in the context of successive 
offensives that demanded medical advancements and resulted in varying soldier experiences. 
Like Macphail, Shepherd looks to the overarching relationships that affected the medical 
community and its decisions regarding soldiers’ care, and the external influences that 
affected those layered decisions. Shepherd then moves into an interwar analysis of larger 
themes of mental health to discuss how perceptions and treatments of mental health changed. 
He addresses the lessons learned and the lessons ignored from the First World War, such as 
the institutional shift away from asylums towards hospitals and the expansion of the 
psychological specialty to include civilians. However, although the psychological specialty 
grew in popularity and respectability, the divide that existed between and within neurologists 
and psychologists during the First World War continued into the Second to the detriment of 
the men.13  
Like Shepherd, Terry Copp and Mark Humphries explore the evolution of trauma in 
war over the 20th century in their book Combat Stress. While Shepherd focuses mainly on 
Britain’s experiences, Copp and Humphries take their analysis to the colonies as well. 
Combat Stress helps connect medical ideas that were prominent in England to those in 
Canada and other Commonwealth countries. Combat Stress also details the downstream 
 
13 Shepherd, A War of Nerves, 164-165. 
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problem of the psychological specialty being at odds not just with itself, but other medical 
specialties. Shepherd notes that there was contention in the interwar period but shifts quickly 
into a discussion about Second World War psychologists isolating heredity in weakness and 
using that to successfully work with the British military to implement a psychological test to 
potential soldiers before they enlisted. Copp and Humphries explore the divisions that existed 
going into the Second World War between the medical community and the military to point 
out that psychology was not equally considered effective, truthful, or beneficial to the 
military complex. As a result of this continued lack of medical agreement on what combat 
stress was, soldiers would needlessly suffer again in the Second World War.14  
While Tim Cook and Mark Osborne Humphries have done exceptional work detailing 
more explicitly the experiences of shell shock among First World War soldiers, this thesis 
will explore the diagnoses and treatments that these men received to demonstrate that while 
the mental health field was evolving, it was not operating through standardized practices but 
generalized ones based upon military need rather than individual medical concerns.  
Terminology: 
The terms used to differentiate the various types of psychological conditions during the 
First World War were vague; what exactly constituted one psychological condition or 
separated one from the other was not definitively established nor consistently applied to 
patients across the CAMC. Shepherd notes that some physicians lamented the use of the term 
shell shock during the war because it was applied to anything and everything.15 It could be 
 
14 Copp and Humphries. Combat Stress in the 20th Century. 143. 
15 Shepherd, A War of Nerves, 13. 
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related to a shell explosion or it could have nothing to do with one; this contributed to its 
liberal use, and then to its subsequent restricted use. Over the course of the war, different 
terms emerged as a way to try and differentiate varied cases of shell shock. The 
differentiation process would include a reassessment of the symptoms to determine if they 
had changed, the triggering incident, and the individual’s personal and family histories. Shell 
shock was associated with a pure case of psychological effect from an accident, whereas 
diagnoses like neurasthenia, neuritis, neuralgia, gastritis, and myalgia were applied to cases 
where classical shell shock symptoms were not be expressed or when they dissipated or 
changed. 
Shell shock and neurasthenia were the two most common terms found in this case 
study; seventy-two per cent of the soldiers in this study were diagnosed with shell shock or 
neurasthenia, or both, over the course of the war. This number increases to eighty-two per 
cent if the diagnoses shell shock-wounded, shell shock severe, nervous, tremors, and neuritis 
are included. Other diagnoses were insanity, melancholia, mental deficiency, mental 
derangement, psychosis, and sick-mental. 
 Shell shock, while also linked to mental affectation, was specifically tied to symptoms 
of nervousness, shakiness, tremors, amnesia, dizziness, mutism, deafness, or any 
combination thereof. It was tied to men who were involved in physical incidents involving 
shellfire and then presented these symptoms afterwards. However, as the war progressed, 
men were appearing in hospitals with shell shock symptoms who had not been involved in a 
shell explosion. The number of soldiers being sent back from the front was so high that 
restrictions had to be placed upon diagnosing a patient with shell shock. According to 
military procedure, a soldier would first present to his unit’s medical officer. There, the 
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decision would be reached about whether or not the soldier should be sent further back to a 
stationary hospital, or even back to England. Only once a soldier got to a hospital with signed 
statement from his superior officers that he had in fact been in a shell accident could that 
soldier be diagnosed with shell shock. Historian Mark Humphries discusses shell shock or 
traumatic shock as a result of a sudden and dramatic event that produced seemingly 
hysterical symptoms by causing functional organic lesions in the central nervous system, 
which mimicked hereditary defects observed in hysterical patients. It was an acute form of 
neurasthenia.  
Neurasthenia was the second most common term to describe a psychological issue in a 
soldier. This term was created in the late 1820s and would come into widespread use during 
the 1870s.16 George M. Beard, one of the people who popularized the term, considered 
neurasthenia to be defined by symptoms of fatigue, anxiety, headaches, heart palpitations, 
high blood pressure, neuralgia or nerve pain, and a depressed mood. Beard connected 
nervous exhaustion of the civilized man with the civilized world. In his 1889 book A 
Practical Treatise on Nervous Exhaustion, he first states that  
the symptoms of neurasthenia are largely of a subjective character. … Unlike the 
existence of surgical and acute and inflammatory diseases, the phenomena of which the 
physicians can see and feel, and for the study of which he is little, if at all, dependent 
on the patient’s intelligence or honesty, they do not appeal directly to the eye or ear or 
touch, and are in fact quite out of the range of all modern appliances…”17  
Here Beard establishes neurasthenia as a vague disorder, easily overlooked by the non-
specialist. During the First World War, it maintained that vague definition, being used as way 
 
16 Shepherd, A War of Nerves, 9. 
17 Beard, George M. and A. D. Rockwell, A Practical Treatise on Nervous Exhaustion (Neurasthenia): Its 
Symptoms, Nature, Sequences, Treatment (New York: E.B. Treat, 1889). 26-27. 
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to explain physical symptoms that were similar to shell shock when the incident could not be 
verified or was not a part of the diagnosis. It was a way to have an illness that was not 
necessarily the fault of the individual. 
 Other terms that arose in this study relating to shell shock and neurasthenia were 
insanity, hysteria, mental disorders such as derangement or deficiency, and psychosis. 
Insanity and hypnosis were typical pre-First World War medical terms to describe 
psychological disorders. Dr. Daniel Kitchen, chief of staff for the hospitals on Blackwell’s 
Island in New York during the 1870s, considered insanity to be “a disease of the brain 
affecting the mind by which there is a change in the person’s mode of acting, thinking, and 
doing things.”18 While he acknowledged that this was a broad jumping-off point, he insisted 
that was the only place to start with diagnosing insanity. While mood can be altered in any 
normal individual, persistent changes in mood or constitution that do not reflect their 
environment or one’s general disposition are also indicative of a state of insanity.19 Mania, 
depression, melancholia leading to pathological sleep, or dementia were the telltale signs of 
insanity for Dr. Kitchen. Hysteria was more complex: “The employment of the word 
‘hysterical’ may sometimes be found indicative of the state of mind of the practitioner rather 
than those of the patient’s health.”20 It was a way for a physicians to convey that something 
was fundamentally altered in a person’s mentality, but that this alteration was “nothing very 
serious as to life.” Hysteria was more closely linked to the nervous system of the individual: 
“a perversion or a complete annihilation of its functions or part of them, no matter whether 
 
18 Daniel H. Kitchen, Lectures on Insanity and Hysteria (New York: Bellevue Press, 1876). 3. 
19 Ibid, 3-4. 
20 Ibid, 89. 
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any physical changes are noticed in organs by instruments and other mean in our power.”21 
Indications of altered organ states were either extreme happiness or sadness; the hysterical 
episode might also include excitement or irritability. Into the First World War, insanity 
would still be identified by excitability, dementia, mania, and depression. Apathy would be a 
newer marker for its diagnosis. It would also be connected to physiological changes within 
the brain as well as psychological changes.22  
The vagueness of the terminology used to define psychological conditions during the 
First World War is indicative of a system of medicine that operated on no standardized 
methods for classification, diagnosis, or treatment.  
Methodology: 
The primary source of material for this project will be fifty randomized personnel files 
of First World War soldiers available online through the Library and Archives Canada 
website. While all service files of soldiers from the First World War have been digitized, 
there is no means of keyword-searching the files. Therefore, the greatest impediment to 
acquiring an adequate and randomized sample to yield any kind of conclusions regarding 
their experience over the course of the war was first identifying and isolating fifty service 
files of men discharged for being mentally unfit from the 673,054 total service records 
digitized from the First World War. 
 
21 Ibid, 93. 
22 Hart, B. The Psychology of Insanity (Cambridge University Press, 1914). 24-25. 
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The first method of attempting to identify servicemen’s files who were discharged for 
being medically unfit was through a randomized list generator that would select a service file 
between 1 and 673, 054 possibilities. This method yielded few soldiers who had been 
discharged for being medically unfit and most of those were not discharged for being 
mentally unfit. 
The second method to find the names of soldiers discharged for being mentally unfit 
was to consult hospital war diaries, also digitized and available on the Library and Archives 
Canada website. Soldiers’ names are occasionally specifically mentioned in the diaries, when 
they were away on leave, struck off strength, or sent to other facilities for treatment. 
Occasionally, this treatment was for psychological distress. However, these diaries are 
separated by unit and time. As a result, names found using this method would only be 
representative of soldiers in a specific unit and their cases would likely only reflect 
experiences after specific battles.  For this case study, this process would not yield the 
desired randomized results. 
A third option was to consult lists of soldiers who, throughout the war, were 
demobilized and sent home for various reasons. They were not sent home on the basis of 
unit, rank, city of origin, race, or level of injury and therefore might represent a fairly 
randomized amalgamation of soldiers from which I could derive representative data. Because 
demobilization took place throughout the war, there is a higher likelihood that the names 
listed are of individuals who were discharged for being medically unfit. This is, however, not 
guaranteed. 
The final method that was pursued and located more than fifty soldiers who were 
discharged for being medically and mentally unfit was through newspapers’ archives. Over 
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the course of the war, lists of names of soldiers who were discharged were released in 
newspapers across Canada. These lists of names included the reason why a soldier had been 
discharged. Through a keyword search of ‘shell shock’ during the years 1914-1919 in 
Canada on newspapers.com, I was able to locate ninety-one soldiers discharged for shell 
shock. In this list, only fifty were viable candidates for this study and even then, some were 
included who were discharged for being physically unfit, who were demobilized, or who 
committed suicide. These men all had instances of mental health affliction in their case files 
and most were being considered for discharge; in some cases, men were returned to duty or 
shifted to light duties for reason of mental unfitness. Ultimately, I identified fifty names that 
were used to create a working baseline for what it was like to be diagnosed and treated for 
psychological wounds in the First World War and what that discharge process looked like 
across class, region, time, and symptoms. 
Chapter Outlines: 
The first chapter examines the diagnostic process involved with treating First World 
War soldiers who were diagnosed with mental health issues to demonstrate that terms and 
practices were generalized rather than standardized. The system functioned on a case-by-case 
basis with follow-up procedures depending on which physicians were treating which patients, 
and what symptoms they were presenting with at the time. Before the war, medical theories 
about intelligence, superiority, and mental health all affected how soldiers were diagnosed. 
As the war progressed, the initially liberal definition of shell shock shifted to be less 
inclusive to offer some level of differentiation and guidance to medical officers. Other 
descriptive terms such as neurasthenia, gastritis, myalgia, mental derangement, and mental 
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deficiency were used in an attempt to ensure that fewer soldiers were classified as having 
shell shock. 
This analysis will start with an examination of medical theories and practices operating 
before the First World War to discuss how they affected diagnostic processes during the war. 
The validity and efficacy of asylums were being questioned, as were the methods that had 
historically been used in them by the mid-1800s. Questions arose in British and North 
American psychology communities about the permanence of hysteria and insanity as 
investigations by psychologists from both continents suggested that keeping people locked 
up and treating them as if they were insane actually reinforced that behaviour as opposed to 
curing it. In fact, the problem that scientists and physicians were having with asylum workers 
was that their medical focus was not on curing their patients but keeping their diseased 
prisoners segregated from society to protect the general population. This was not so different 
from the assumption, widely held during the First World War, that mentally afflicted men 
had to be removed from their units temporarily, lest they infect other soldiers. 
In the second chapter, treatment given to First World War soldiers affected with mental 
health illnesses will be examined to demonstrate that treatments were varied depending, not 
on the disease itself, but on which diagnosis a soldier received, what hospital he was in, what 
doctors he saw, his rank, and how debilitated he was. In three sections, this chapter explores 
how prioritizing military efficiency over individual care affected that care, how rank and 
classism affected treatment, and how the practices of psychologists and neurologists differed, 
to the degree that a soldier’s treatment could depend on the hospital to which he was 
transferred, rather than anything inherent in his condition. These sections will demonstrate 
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together that care was situationally dependent on factors that were not, and could not be, 
standardized, resulting in differing levels of care over the CAMC. 
The final chapter takes themes explored in the first two chapters and applies them to 
individual case files as a means of demonstrating that, within this case study, soldiers 
experienced differing levels of non-standardized care. It compares soldiers who were 
diagnosed with shell shock and then subsequently neurasthenia and the reasons behind 
diagnosing a person with one and then the other. It then looks at the experiences of officers 
and how those were different from men. Finally, it takes a look at a malingering soldier to 
reveal a truism of the history of shell shock: it was impossible to fake a bullet wound, but 
relatively easy to pretend to have psychological symptoms.   
Ultimately, this thesis argues that in this period of war, change, conflicting priorities, 
and divergent theories, medical care could not have been standardized and could only have 
been generally applied situationally. 
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Chapter 1  
1 Diagnosis.  
Patient is a foreigner and never speaks. 
Insomnia – Marked. Sleeps not more than 4 hours in 24 hours. 
Appetite – Good. Bolts his food ravenously. 
Temperament – Docile and obedient. 
Habits – Childish, collecting articles such as pieces of wood, nails, tins, etc., and making 
mud balls with which he plays continuously. Has a habit of taking off socks when he puts 
on his cap.23 
Gerasim Stecenko was born in Russian Kiev on 4 March 1885. Married to Justina, 
he was trained as a blacksmith and, before immigrating to Canada, had served three years 
in the Russian Army. On 12 July 1915, Stecenko was living in Quebec and enlisted in the 
15th Battalion, 1st Reinforcement Draft. He would move from there to the 14th Battalion 
and ultimately end up in the 23rd Reserve Battalion of the Canadian Expeditionary Force. 
Pte Stecenko trained for nine months in Quebec before making it to the front in France. 
Three months later, he was put into a firing trench where, after his first day at the front, 
he reported to his medical officer with a headache. It was not considered serious, and he 
was discharged back to his unit. The next day, “a shell exploded near him[…] killing his 
friend and knocking him down.”24 After two fainting spells, he was sent to No. 3 
 
23 Library and Archives Canada, Personnel Records of the First World War, RG 150 “Stecenko, Gerasim.” 
RG 150, Accession 1992-93/166, Box 9251 – 14. Item Number 248781. Regimental Number 448219. 
24 Ibid. 
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Canadian Field Ambulance with the additional symptoms of insomnia, pain in his leg 
whenever his head ached, abnormal childlike behavior, and shell shock.25 Over the 
course of his transfers in and out of hospitals, his diagnosis would change from shell 
shock to insanity. The decisions that led his physicians to this point will be explained 
here to demonstrate an individualized system of care based on specific interactions, 
symptoms, and history. 
At No. 10 Canadian Field Hospital, Pte Stecenko was judged to be violent, 
disobedient, and with poor hygiene; it was noted that he rarely spoke as he was foreign. 
At Moore Barracks, a Canadian and British hospital otherwise known as the Royal 
Military Hospital in Shorncliffe, England, his physicians dug deeper, under the initial 
diagnosis of shell shock, to investigate the validity of his illness as he was not presenting 
with classic shell shock symptoms; by that time, malingering or pretending to have shell 
shock, was becoming a problem for to the military. Physicians reported that he was 
collecting small objects, like nails, with no clear purpose and that he had a family history 
that pointed to mental weakness as opposed to shell shock. Both Pte Stecenko’s brother 
and his father had a history of debilitating headaches to the point where his brother had 
had to be operated on twice for them. Another symptom that caught his physician’s eye 
was that Pte Stecenko’s physical condition was unusually good. Physicians noted that he 
was well-nourished and therefore fit. The implication in his file was that physicians did 
not expect to see someone with his mental affliction to look like him; the fact that he was 
physically fit for service pushed them further from a diagnosis of debilitating nervous 
 
25 Ibid. 
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shell shock to one of insanity. Finally, the fact that Pte Stecenko had suffered similar 
head pain during his service in the Russian Army, in conjunction with him failing a 
neurological test, shifted his diagnosis from shell shock to neurasthenia and delusional 
insanity. Pte Stecenko had presented with head pain and was in proximity to a shell 
explosion, but he was neither injured by said explosion nor exhibiting any nervousness, 
shaking, or tremors. The leg pain he presented with as a symptom of the explosion was 
tested through endurance and physical pain stimuli. Doctors struck his leg and had him 
stand and walk, and Pte Stecenko reported feeling no more pain.  In light of his history 
and absence of significant physical pain, a diagnosis of shell shock was no longer 
applicable to his case. What doctors used to help choose his diagnosis shifted to analyses 
of his personal hygiene, comportment, and mental state: “His habits are dirty and 
degraded”;26 He suffered from “foul breath” and inflamed gums, indicative of a lower-
class individual; “Patient cries once a day for at least ten minutes. He is, in fact now, 
never violent, always obedient, and clean since his admission.”27 These symptoms in 
conjunction with his child-like behaviour and obsessive practices resulted in diagnoses of 
neurasthenia, then acute mania, and finally delusional insanity. His condition was 
ultimately considered aggravated by shell shock, but not created by it. The Medical 
Board reviewing his case could not determine the length of time his illness would persist, 
saying that with these symptoms and prognosis it was “impossible to say,” so he was 
 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
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“discharged in consequence of being found medically unfit” on 11 May 1916.28 
Symptoms Pte Stecenko was exhibiting as well as his personal history and character 
pointed his physicians away from a diagnosis of shell shock towards neurasthenia and 
delusional insanity.  
Contemporary medical diagnoses for mental disorders represented both 
opportunity and restriction for patients seeking care in the First World War; patients 
received changing medical diagnoses, which changed both their understanding of self and 
of how physicians interacted with them and administered treatment. The action of 
identifying someone with a specific disease or illness and then treating them for that had 
an effect on a patient’s perceived and social identity.29 One particular diagnosis over 
another might assign an individual a specific course of medication and to particular 
medical facilities, affect how other perceive them as well as how they perceive 
themselves, and it might well result in loss of freedoms.  
During the First World War, what exactly constituted mental health was unclear 
and maintaining good mentality was a priority only insofar as it contributed to the good 
morale of the collective and kept up unit strength. Problems with mental health were 
referred to as mental disorders or diseases and could be psychologically or physically 
incurred; physical causes were inherently more respectable as they were typically not the 
 
28 Ibid. 
29 Clarke, Juanne N., and Susan James. "The Radicalized Self: The Impact on the Self of the Contested 
Nature of the Diagnosis of Chronic Fatigue Syndrome." Social Science & Medicine 57, no. 8 (2003): 1387-
395. doi:10.1016/s0277-9536(02)00515-4.  
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result of a person’s weakness, but of an accident or trauma.30 The stigmas against mental 
health issues for the soldiers were widely known and encouraged by the military to 
maintain both morale and military strength; for a soldier to be suffering from any mental 
health issues would suggest, at various points in the war, that he was weak, unintelligent, 
feminine, cowardly, irresponsible, and/or homosexual. Essentially, it would mean that he 
was not a man and therefore not a soldier. As the war progressed, however, some mental 
afflictions became acceptable to the men, but in ways that still supported traditional ideas 
of masculinity and permitted the maintenance of unit strength. If a soldier had been on 
the front for an extended period of time, fellow soldiers would understand if he became 
shell shocked; he had served his time, protected his fellow men, and deserved a break 
from the front. The personnel files of such soldiers tended to reflect an individual of good 
military character, rather than suggesting that he was malingering. All these factors had a 
restricting effect on medical officers whose goal was to determine how fit the soldier was 
and what kind of treatment he would receive to be rehabilitated and returned to the front. 
This war was to be won with numbers and the army was not going to lose strength to the 
hospitals and asylums if it could be avoided. Combined with the fact that the typical 
physician’s understanding of mental health, psychological practices, and neurological 
practices was minimal, the outcome for these soldiers was frequent misdiagnoses, poor 
treatment regimes, and the overall mishandling of the soldiers’ health.  Although the 
Canadian and Royal Army Medical Corps attempted to revise medical practices over the 
 
30 Richards, Edward G. The Psychological Origin of Mental Disorders. (New York & London: Funk and 
Wagnalls Company, 1913). 
6 
 
course of the war, there were no specific medical protocols in place, and no standardized 
health care approaches established for men afflicted with psychological disorders during 
the First World War. This chapter will focus on the diagnostic processes of the CAMC 
and the RAMC concerning psychologically afflicted men who were ultimately discharged 
for being medically unfit. It will demonstrate the variety of definitions of shell shock, the 
possible impact of being diagnosed by different physicians, and the fundamentally 
inconsistent nature of mental health care in the First World War. 
This chapter will explore the Canadian Army Medical Corps and the medical 
facilities in which it operated, ultimately to demonstrate that diagnosis and the diagnostic 
process were not standardized but generalized. A standardized approach to diagnosis 
implies that there were set medical protocols for all military physicians and medical 
personnel to follow when a soldier presented with symptoms, complaints, injuries, and 
issues that permitted specific diagnoses, treatment, and care. In contrast, a generalized 
approach is the concept that physicians had all-encompassing diagnoses, like shell shock, 
that could be applied in various conditions and general approaches to treating 
psychological illnesses. Describing the Canadian and British systems of medicine in 
place during the First World War as standardized indicates that there was a level of 
understanding that did not exist and that this level of understanding was agreed upon as 
standard by all medial and military personnel. To begin this analysis, this chapter will 
highlight pre-First World War assumptions about psychiatric care and neurological 
theories to construct a basic road map of the knowledge that the two main camps of 
physicians dealing with it brought to their diagnostic processes. The chapter will outline 
commonly held beliefs that arose from treating mental illnesses during the war, to 
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consider how those ideas changed medical knowledge in post-war medicine. Specifically, 
by examining medical theories at the time and soldier case files, this chapter will examine 
the diagnostic process, and what those diagnoses suggest about the state of 
standardization in medicine during the war. 
There are three major arguments in this first chapter. First, men were diagnosed 
based on the symptoms they presented with; symptoms, especially symptoms of mental 
or psychological origins, changed frequently or were intermittent, and therefore 
diagnoses changed. Second, diagnoses changed not because of improved standardization 
but because physicians were instructed to diagnose men in specific ways in order to get 
them back on the front or to prevent them from being sent back to the hospital at all. 
Instead of permitting soldiers leave back to England or Canada, the military was 
concerned with maintaining strength, and therefore put pressure on the medical corps to 
keep their men diagnosed with temporary or curable ailments. Mental ailments, being 
inconsistent and inconclusive, could be considered temporary.  
1.1 Pre-First World War Theories and Practices of Mental Health. 
The incidence of war neuroses, a broader term to include more psychological 
issues associated with wartime than shell shock, pre-dates the First World War by at least 
two centuries. In 17th-century France, army doctors noted that soldiers experienced a kind 
of homesickness that made their bodies weak and vulnerable to infection. They called it 
nostalgia, a condition typically associated with emigrant populations who came to Europe 
to work but could not acclimate, after noticing a similar affliction in French soldiers. “By 
the early 1700s, some doctors reported that nostalgia was a prevailing condition in the 
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armies of Europe.”31 In the 19th century, with the Crimean War in 1853 and the 
American Civil War in 1861, medical professionals in Britain and the United States had 
become well acquainted with nostalgia, but had conceptualized the problem as a cardiac 
one. Irritable heart, soldier’s heart, or disordered action of the heart were the 
interchangeable terms that had come to describe a version of war neuroses in the Western 
world. In an 1871 case study of over three hundred Civil War veterans from every army 
division of the United States, Dr. J.M. Da Costa stated that this irritable heart was not a 
new disorder, but one that could be linked back to British descriptions of ill soldiers in 
Crimea. Soldiers would experience fevers, diarrhea, intermittent gastric problems, 
breathlessness, dizziness, palpitations, chest pains, and a gradual inability to perform 
their soldierly duties.32 The cause was overexertion, lack of sleep, poor nutrition, 
homesickness, and other illnesses. These soldiers, after a round through the relevant 
hospitals, were either discharged or placed in an invalid corps of troops.33 Sarah 
Hartzinger and Jean Scandlyn, in their article “Decentering PTSD: A War Outgrows a 
Diagnosis,” note that while there are commonalities between irritable heart, shell shock, 
and ultimately PTSD, irritable heart was perceived as a physiological problem and treated 
that way with medication to slow the heart, convalescence, and physical training.34 
 
31 Copp and Humphries. Combat Stress in the 20th Century. 1. 
32 Da Costa, J. M. On Irritable Heart, A Clinical Study of a Form of Functional Cardiac Disorder and Its 
Consequences. (S.l.: Elsevier BV, 1871). 20. 
33 Ibid, 20-21. 
34 Hautzinger, Sarah, and Jean Scandlyn. “Decentering PTSD: A War Outgrows a Diagnosis.” In Beyond 
Post-Traumatic Stress, 96–114. 1st ed. Routledge, 2014. 100-101.  
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During the First World War, neurologists and cardiologists worked alongside the newer 
psychologists, a partnership that helped to reframe war neuroses around psychological as 
well as physiological causes as more and more soldiers were presenting with no heart 
affectation and were not involved in a physical accident. The link between mental health 
and war is a long and complicated one shaped by medicine, war, and society; the First 
World War, with its massive number of casualties, permitted medicine to evolve its 
understanding of war neuroses as a mental health issue.   
The fields of biology, physiology, anatomy, and medicine were expanding over 
the 19th century, bringing discoveries and theories of the cell. The knowledge of the cell, 
the gene, bacteria, and germs permitted the possibility of control over the human body 
and health in a way that medicine did not have before; the role of the physician had 
shifted from a passive to active one as they could potentially determine cause and cure an 
illnesses.35 Before the First World War, British, Canadian, and American physicians were 
openly recognizing the limits of mental health facilities, in so much as they had yet to 
develop a cure for insanity and recovery rates were not improving. In 1885, Dr. D. Hack 
Tuke released The Insane in the United States and Canada, which detailed the history of 
asylums in the United States and Canada and provided an analysis of his tours of both 
countries’ current systems. Dr. Tuke, after looking into the American asylum system, 
alienists, and the treatment of the insane, concluded that like the asylum system in 
Britain, “they have not utilized, to the extent they ought to have done, the materials at 
 
35 Ackerknecht, Erwin Heinz, Charles E. Rosenberg, and Lisa Haushofer. A Short History of Medicine. 
(Baltimore & London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1968). 158-159. 
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their command; that their annual reports are defective in scientific results; that they have 
made no great important discoveries in the treatment of insanity.”36 The concept of an 
asylum had shifted from essentially a jail to a hospital and, in the process, its inmates 
became patients. The sickness of insanity was broadening to include temporary states or 
states brought on by a physical cause; insanity was becoming a treatable illness.  The 
expectation had therefore shifted to suppose that alienists, neurologists, and psychologists 
could make headway into cures or treatments for the now various conditions of insanity. 
Dr. Tuke took this concept further to discuss the reality of what it meant to cure insanity, 
and what insanity meant to the population of Britain, Canada, and the United States. 
While shifting assumptions about mental health would have beneficial outcomes, social 
constraints still limited practical growth in the field. In his analysis of the American 
asylum system, Tuke demonstrated the inherent bias that was endemic in the medical 
system: “the authorities have had enormous difficulties to contend with from the fact of 
society in America being in a state of continual fusion, including the mixture of races 
consequent upon immigration.”37 Tuke believed that it could not be the fault of the 
American or British asylum systems that they were being forced to deal with the insane 
of foreign countries: “Between 1820 and 1850, 2,250,000 emigrants landed in the United 
States, making one-tenth of the population foreign. The number of insane in 1850 was 
15,610, and of these, 2,049 or very nearly one-seventh, were foreigners.” If more patients 
 
36 Tuke, Daniel Hack, The Insane in the United States and Canada. (London, Eng.: H.K. Lewis, 1885). 95. 
37 Ibid, 96. 
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in asylums were minority groups, that seemed to mean that these groups were more likely 
to suffer from poor mental health. Furthermore: 
The census of 1880 showed the number of insane to be 91,959; of these, new 
fewer than 26,346, or between one-fourth and one-third, were not American born. 
In other words, 13-33 per cent of the general population-that is to say, the 
imported element-produced 28-75 per cent of so called American lunacy.38 
Dr. Tuke also makes clear that the incidence of insanity among black Americans was 
three times lower than the incidence of insanity among foreign-born Americans.39 At the 
end of the day, the former were at least born in the United States and therefore considered 
more American by American and British physicians, giving them more of a right to be 
treated in American asylums. These growing number of patients to care for explained, at 
least for Dr. Tuke and his medical community, why insanity had to be cured; the asylum 
system in the US was being over-extended and burdened by caring for the overwhelming 
number of foreign mentally ill patients. It could not therefore be expected to advance the 
science of treatment, let alone advance a cure. Reforms to the asylum system served as a 
way of explaining why experts had yet to find a cure; this process found scapegoats in 
immigration populations as opposed to looking at treatment methods and conceptions of 
diseases. This analytical work alludes to commonly held beliefs of social hygiene in the 
medical community which, around the turn of the twentieth century, believed humanity to 
be hierarchically organized according to their genes. This affected how civilian patients 
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were treated and would impact the diagnosis and treatment of soldiers during the First 
World War. 
Dr. Tuke found a broader spectrum of care and medical advancements in the 
Canadian asylum system. Asylums in Quebec were not being led by medical men with a 
competent knowledge of insanity nor were there frequent inspections made by “efficient” 
men.40 Being without the guidance of qualified, modern, and capable medical authorities 
left Quebec asylums to reflect older trends in the organization of asylums: little money 
for clothing and individual maintenance, poor diets that resulted in malnutrition, few 
attendants, which made proper patient care impossible, the use of physical restraints, and 
physicians of low caliber because the hospital had not allocated enough money to entice 
more highly educated doctors to work there.41 This also meant that, like the physicians 
and alienists in the American system, they were not advancing scientific inquiry to 
discover a cure for insanity or improve the treatment of the afflicted.  In Ontario, Dr. 
Tuke called attention to the fact that mechanical restraints were also still actively being 
used on patients, despite the determination by alienists that they were unnecessary or 
rather impeded patient care.42 Specifically, the asylum in London was guilty of still using 
these restraints actively. However, Dr. Tuke admired that Ontario asylums were taking 
seriously the distinction between the incurably insane and the curably insane.  Through 
the construction of external small adjacent buildings, Ontario asylums could effectively 
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41 Ibid, 204-205. 
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and completely segregate their curable patients from their incurable, who would remain 
in the larger facility closer to necessary medical equipment and more staff.43 Another 
advance that Canada had made was that, at least in its private asylums, people had to 
meet admission requirements: 
No patient can be admitted (except upon an order by the Lieutenant-Governor) 
without the certificates of two medical practitioners, each attested by two 
witnesses, and bearing date within three months of admission. Each certificate 
must state that the examination was made separately from any other practitioner, 
and after due inquiry into all necessary facts; the medical practitioner specifying 
the fats upon which he had formed his opinion, and distinguishing those observed 
by himself from those communicated to him by others.44  
One of the biggest differences between the systems in Quebec and Ontario was that 
Ontario had made the care for the insane the responsibility of the province. Dr. Daniel 
Clarke, the director at the head of the Toronto Insane Asylum, believed that in doing so, 
treating insanity would be much easier with more funding.45 The insane man was a 
victim of his own personality and the role of the insane asylum should be to assess each 
man one on one, to better inform the field of psychology and turn the asylum into a 
hospital to treat these afflicted individuals.46  Clarke insisted that all definitions of 
insanity “must, of necessity, be of a general character, as the signs and symptoms vary as 
each individual from any other person.”47 Intellectual level was also not grounds for a 
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diagnosis of insanity, according to Clarke: “idiocy or imbecility are simply arrested brain 
development from nutritive or trophic defect, with the consequent mental limitation.”48 
Whereas intellect is the product of physiological action or inaction, insanity is a disease. 
He went into further detail, explaining that insanity was the result of lesions on the brain 
and molecular changes that happened suddenly or gradually, “yet no initiary stage [can] 
be pointed out.”49 Clarke believed that the weakening of the mind and the onset of 
possible lesions was caused by age, lack of sleep, fatigue, mental incapacity, “by a 
feeling of goneness in the body,” an inability to concentrate, poor memory, low morale, 
and poor appetite.50 These theories and concepts came out of experiential asylum 
interaction that twenty years later would be used to help specify which mental illness an 
individual was suffering from. Tuke’s and Clarke’s books help illustrate where medical 
science was moving in North America with respect to mental health in general and reflect 
what social constraints were active in the functioning of those medical systems moving 
into the First World War. How physicians, servicemen, and civilians conceptualized 
mental health all impacted the health care system that attended to the injured and 
wounded of the First World War. 
Private James Jackson is a tragic example of a soldier experiencing a mental 
health affliction that could not be properly taken care of because of the  context of the 
First World War: general suspicions of malingering, the push on medical officers to 
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return any relatively able-bodied and -minded men to the front as quickly as possible, and 
the state of medical knowledge more broadly. Pte Jackson was a Glaswegian who 
enlisted into Lord Strathcona’s Horse on 23 September 1914. He was admitted to Moore 
Barracks on 17 January 1917 for Melancholia. Three days later, he was transferred to the 
1st West General Hospital in Fazakerley, Liverpool, as his condition deteriorated. After 
four days there, he was transferred to Moore Barracks Canadian Hospital in Shorncliffe, 
Kent.51 At Moore Barracks, the Admitting Officer noted his observations about Pte 
Jackson 
The marginally named man has for some days been suffering from mental trouble. 
He gives a history of seminal emissions for two years, and has lately developed a 
melancholic condition. He has ideas of persecution and thinks some occult power 
in responsible for his condition. Kindly have him placed under observation and if 
necessary boarded.52 
His physician repeated these observations on Pte Jackson’s Medical History Case Sheet 
and added: “He is somewhat depressed but answers questions intelligently, does not hear 
voices etc. his memory is good and he is perfectly oriented. In my opinion he is simple a 
case of mental deficiency.”53 The physician believed that Pte Jackson did not need to be 
institutionalized but would improve if he were returned to civilian life.  As a result of 
this, a medical board prepared his discharge papers and he was invalided to Canada on 12 
March 1917. On 11 April 1917 he committed suicide. The focus in his file on his 
intellectual abilities shows an ideological belief among his physicians that insanity, 
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melancholia, or mental health afflictions in general were tied to some extent to lower 
intelligence. They explained that he could answer questions intelligently, but because he 
still exhibited psychosis, he was still regarded as mentally deficient.54  
Social hygiene and eugenic theories, like the idea that intelligence was inherited 
and could be tied to mental illnesses, affected how soldiers were diagnosed in the First 
World War. Despite the declared good intentions of Dr. Tuke to improve the care and 
prognosis of the insane, there were elements of social hygiene and discrimination 
throughout his book. He separated patients by race and nationality, stated openly that 
immigrants had higher rates of poor mental health, and lamented the fact that any 
“lunatic” who committed a crime in Ontario was not immediately sent to jail.55 This in-
depth analysis of asylums in indicative of a deeply ingrained belief that humanity was 
hierarchically created. That eugenic brand of Galtonian thinking can be seen in multiple 
soldiers’ files in this case study.  
Sir Francis Galton, cousin to Sir Charles Darwin, took the theory of evolution and 
adapted it to postulate selective human breeding as a way to perfect the human race. 
Evolution is a theory that over time and through environmental pressures, different traits 
within an individual will be selected to better ensure the survival of the species.56 
Eugenics is the idea that there are superior and inferior traits in people, like intelligence, 
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that can be isolated and bred out.57 This theory is racist, sexist, and provided the basis for 
many flawed scientific practices. Beyond the basic idea that poor genes needed to be bred 
out to improve the race were ideas about who were carriers of poor genes and how they 
could be identified. Poor speech, a family history of questionable employment or poor 
mental health, sexually transmitted illnesses, and masturbation were just some of the 
identifiers that physicians noted in soldiers’ files to gauge mental capability to ultimately 
determine when and how, or even if, they could be rehabilitated and sent back to the 
front. Pte Stecenko was considered by his physicians to be weak due to his family 
history, his inability to speak English, his history with the Russian Army, and his 
childlike actions and hallucinatory and paranoid symptoms. The underlying common 
symptom that connected all the melancholic patients in this study was that they were all 
also diagnosed insane, with varying underlying causes such as alcoholism, mental 
derangement, mental breakdown, dementia, and suicidal thoughts. 
Humphries considered the evolution of neurology and neurological explanations 
for poor bouts of mental health as having emerged out of a desire or need to expand the 
two states of accepted mental condition from sane and insane to a spectrum. Many 
instances can be cited before the First World War where otherwise respected, upper-class, 
and fit men had inexplicable lapses in psychological fitness. Society could not continue to 
function by imprisoning people with mild, manageable, or modular mental illnesses any 
more than it could continue without a cure for insanity. Science had to explain not only 
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why insanity was sometimes temporary, but also why people of various classes could 
contract the same illness of the mind. As the neurological field evolved, it came to be 
understood that some individuals were physically injured in such a way that could result 
in psychological symptoms. If they were mentally ill at the mercy of their own 
physiology, then their condition could be treated, and they had the possibility of being 
rehabilitated. Rehabilitating and returning to the front soldiers affected with mental health 
issues during the First World War became necessary very quickly. As a result, medicine 
rotated from discharging all soldiers who were shell shocked to using alternative 
diagnoses and creating more transitional hospitals that could provide triage care and 
prevent congestion in hospitals. 
1.2 First World War Theories and Practices.  
Prominent theories held by the medical and military communities about mental health 
leading up to the First World War affected how soldier were treated during the war. One 
of the ways in which soldier health care was affected lay in the level of military 
involvement in the hospitals and the theoretical beliefs of the physicians operating in 
those hospitals. In his book A Weary Road: Shell Shock in the Canadian Expeditionary 
Force, 1914-1919, Dr. Mark Osborne Humphries makes clear that while civilian-run or 
temporary military hospitals with civilian-trained staff operated with more freedom, 
military hospitals operated under strict and standardized care: “While the process at 
Netley [Hospital] could be standardized because most of the staff were drawn from the 
ranks of the regular RAMC [or Royal Army Medical Corps], civilian ‘consulting’ 
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neurologists and psychiatrists were used to a great deal more autonomy.”58 Essentially, 
Netley Hospital had specific protocols in place that its physicians all followed when 
diagnosing and treating patients with specific psychological issues whereas civilian 
physician-run hospitals approached mental health care on a more individual basis. 
Outside of his implication that a military-run organization imbues standardization 
alongside a discussion of streamlining psychological terminology, Humphries does not 
expand upon this phenomenon. Standardization is classified as the development of an 
agreed-upon set of rules or guidelines that will direct work and ideally result in desirable 
outcomes.59 The International Standardization Organization offers a broader definition: 
“Standardization is the activity of establishing, with regard to actual or potential 
problems, provisions for common and repeated use, aimed at the achievement of the 
optimum degree of order in a given context.”60 In this context, the practice of creating 
forms, terminology, and sets of treatments for soldiers suffering from shell shock or other 
psycho-physiological ailments could mean a movement towards attempting to establish 
standardization, but it falls short of equating to standardized practice or care and is better 
described as generalization. “For the troubles displayed in the many disorders classed 
under the official title shell shock are extraordinarily numerous and different, and their 
removal necessitates a similarly varied repertoire of ‘opening moves’ on the part of the 
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physician.”61 The process of simplification of terms to generally diagnose an illness 
according to the discretion of the physician does not equate to the creation of 
standardization. The capabilities of medical staff in the CAMC during the First World 
War was varied and their efficacy continuously impeded by numerous exterior factors.  
Ben Shephard’s A War of Nerves: Soldier and Psychiatrists, 1914-1994 traces the 
evolution of our understanding of psychology in war over the course of the twentieth 
century. In this book, he discusses the British army’s “model of human psychology”: 
“Men were either sick, well, wounded or mad; anyone neither sick, wounded, nor mad 
but nonetheless unwilling to or incapable of fighting was necessarily a coward, to be shot 
if necessary.”62 The name of the game was war, and the strategy was to have better 
working pieces than the opponent; barring that, more pieces would have to do. This 
mentality served the army so long as it had cooperation from the medical community. 
The military could not permit its men to be sent back to England or Canada in sufficient 
number to deplete the forces at the front. After the offensive on the Somme (1916), so 
many men were sent back to England and Canada with shell shock and other similar 
diagnoses that the military placed restrictions on physicians covering what diagnoses they 
could pronounce. At first, shell shock was a relatively unknown illness and many men 
were sent back under its wide umbrella. After 1916, new regulations prohibited casualty 
stations, ambulances, and convalescent station medical personnel from diagnosing a 
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soldier with shell shock but had to send him to a hospital where physicians would 
conduct an investigation to determine what exactly the man was sick with. His superiors 
had to confirm that he had been affected by the explosion of a shell, and only then could 
they diagnose him thus. This method of triage indicates a desire for efficiency. However, 
the eventual elimination of “shell shock” from medical parlance cannot be considered 
standardization but generalized and simplified medical care that served the military 
machine.  
An important reason why diagnoses were subjective and changeable was that they 
were dependent upon the symptoms a soldier presented with and the physician he was 
presented to. Because symptoms are always the most apparent indication of a problem, 
and indeed might be potential problems themselves, they have traditionally been the 
target of medical care. What patients were complaining of and how they were acting – 
that was what was wrong, and what needed to be treated. As an example, the extent to 
which a soldier was shaking could mean the difference between a diagnosis of shell 
shock, hysteria, or epilepsy; tremors and nervousness were almost essential in the 
diagnosis of shell shock and neurasthenia, as they were nervous diseases and had to have 
a nervous connection. In the case of Lance-Corporal Harry James Salmond, his diagnosis 
shifted drastically over the course of his military career. Lance-Cpl Salmond was a 39-
year-old fireman from Rangoon, British Burma, living in Toronto when he enlisted in the 
4th Battalion. Over the course of his time overseas, Salmond found himself in and out of 
hospitals. First, he was shot in his right leg on 25 April 1915. A few months later he 
subsequently reported to No. 1 and No. 2 Canadian Field Ambulances for nervousness. 
This initial diagnosis was gradually expanded to “alcoholism, nervous exhaustion or 
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neurasthenia, and bullet wound to his thigh” at Moore Barracks.63 Having gotten some 
rest, he was discharged. Almost six months later, on 5 April 1916, he was admitted 
straight to No. 20 General Hospital in Camiers for a self-inflicted severe wound to the 
throat. The physician noted that “He says that he felt despondent and wanted to finish 
himself.”64 The circumstances surrounding the event were never made clear in his file. 
Lance-Corporal Salmond’s physical condition at the time of admission was “nervous and 
excitable.” Four days later at No. 26 General Hospital in Étaples, his physicians 
concluded that he had had a nervous breakdown that resulted in self-harm. After a month 
in Étaples, he was transferred to the Royal Victoria Hospital in Netley. A week later, the 
Royal Victoria sent him to Moore Barracks in Shorncliffe where he was diagnosed with 
melancholia. Lance-Corp Salmond had at this point reported to the Moore Barracks 
physicians that he was experiencing nervousness and a “dull feeling in the head”. Moore 
Barracks delved more deeply into his family history in an attempt to uncover any reason 
for his attempted suicide; was there hereditary evidence to support that this was not 
caused by war but simply aggravated by it? Salmond’s father had shot himself and the 
condition of his mother remained unknown.65 His mental condition had hereditary links 
and therefore was presumed not to have been caused by the war. “Patient answers 
questions in an intelligent way but seems very depressed.”66 A medical board in July 
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1916 concluded: “1. That he is still insane. 2. That he was insane at the time of his 
attempt of suicide. 3. That he would not be fit for action service for a period of at least six 
months.”67 After treatment in Canada, his diagnosis shifted, or rather was made clearer; 
physicians at the Stationary Hospital in Halifax considered his condition to be 
neurasthenia and mental deficiency. A significant contributor to this conclusion was that, 
alongside his previous history of self-harm, he was suspected as having injected 
something into his frontal sinus to alleviate pressure caused by congestion from a cold. 
The following medical notes indicate that he gradually felt that he no longer wanted to 
continue participating in studies and that wanted to be discharged so he could return to 
his job. On 20 April his physician noted that Salmond had been depressed for the past 
two days, although nothing was said about what sort of treatment he would or did receive 
and what that meant for his prognosis. On 9 May 1918, Salmond’s physician noted that 
he had been sleeping well, reported no headaches, and was generally feeling fine, and 
sent his case along for review for discharge to the medical board. Over the course of the 
war, Lance-Corp Salmond was diagnosed with eight different illnesses, each 
corresponding with different or altered symptoms; his condition evolved from simple 
debility with headaches on 1 July 1916 to neurasthenia and mental deficiency on 21 
August 1918.68  Initially physical symptoms, family history, character, and the 
circumstances under which he was injured all combined to inform the diagnosis. 
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Sociocultural restraints also contributed to the diagnostic process. The diagnosis a 
soldier received affected his reputation in the army and, by extension, the reputations of 
any medical officers or staff who were in charge of his wellbeing. If a soldier was indeed 
shell shocked, then he was privileged enough to be considered a casualty not of his own 
making, but of unforeseen events. If a soldier was considered a neurasthenic or 
melancholic, a weakness that was innate to his personality or genetics was at fault and he 
would be considered a coward or unfit.  In his article “War’s Long Shadow: Masculinity, 
Medicine and the Gendered Politics of Trauma, 1914-1939” and his book A Weary Road, 
Mark Humphries explores the role of the physician in the perpetuation of masculine 
social constructs and constraints. The Victorian (1837-1901) and the Edwardian (1901-
1910) eras’ constructs of and constraints on masculinity show men as stoic, non-
emotional, and strong. Earlier in the nineteenth century, men spent more time in the 
home, but according to John Tosh there was a mass shift away from men in the home that 
he dubbed the “flight from domesticity.”69 For these men of the late Victorian era, 
“domesticity no longer represented a fresh vision of comfort and reassurance, but a 
straightjacket.”70 This shift away from domesticity was also tied to a reluctance to marry: 
“young men [were] giving up matrimony as if it were some silly old habit suited to their 
grandfathers and grandmothers.”71 A culture surrounding the independence of the 
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younger man arose in which it was expected that men take their time to become men and 
establish themselves through their work outside of the home to best connect and support 
it in a globalizing economy and international community. Participating in the First World 
War was adhering to, historically, “the most masculine of activities.”72 However, with 
the First World War, the loss of masculinity could occur in numerous unpredictable 
ways. A loss of courage, an inability to control one’s emotions and break down, 
uncontrolled aggression, a weak will, and mental deficiency were only a few of the signs 
that men were having difficulty maintaining their masculinity while the war took its toll 
on them mentally and physically. Historian Fiona Reid discusses shell shock as a way to 
explore the Victorian culture of masculinity in crisis in the face of the war: “Medical and 
military responses to shell shock repeatedly stressed the importance of will power and of 
the man’s personal commitment to his own recovery.”73 If a man was dedicated to 
recovery, he would recover. Discipline and self-control were touted as strong 
characteristics not seen in the “nervous, impulsive, erratic, and unstable” neurasthenic.74 
The onus was on the man to have the strength of character and will to keep his mental 
state in check and then, if that failed him, to have the will to recover. This understanding 
of men extended into the doctor-patient relationship in the RAMC and would, by 
extension, be experienced by CAMC officers and men being treated by them.  
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But different classes of men did not experience mental disorders in the same way, 
and multiple doctors are recorded as noting differences in medical experiences between 
men and officers. Sir Robert Armstrong Jones of the RAMC noted that officers were less 
likely to lose their voices in cases of shell shock because officers were more educated and 
intelligent, and therefore less susceptible to “emotional shock.”75 Dr. Frederick Mott, a 
British physician, agreed with Armstrong that officers were more likely to experience 
cases of “pure shell shock” whereas men were hysterical paralytics and hysterical as 
opposed to shocked.76 In 1919, Mott published his book War Neuroses and Shell Shock 
in which he postulated that “The majority of so-called ‘shell shock’ are truly ‘emotional 
shock’.”77 Emotional shock was “dependent in a great measure upon the personality of 
the individual soldier, his mental attitude, and bodily condition at the time of the shock 
(whether of emotional or commotional origin) which led to his collapse.”78 Traumatic 
shock resulted when a soldier was involved in a physical event that involved the 
compression of the air (such as in the explosion of a shell). This compression of air was 
deemed to have a physical effect on the internal chemistry of the soldier, whether that be 
from jostling or a lack of oxygen after being buried by debris.79 In 1917, Dr. Grafton 
Smith wrote Shell Shock and its Lessons in which he discussed psychological analysis 
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and determined (like Mott) that the trouble with mental illness or shell shock was 
predominantly emotional 
Many cases of ‘functional nervous disorder’ or ‘neurosis’ exhibit as their most 
important characteristics symptoms, the underlying factors of which are 
demonstrably mental. A neurosis may be regarded as the failure of an act of 
adaptation. The resultant mental disturbances do not seriously affect the ‘reason’ 
or the ‘intellect’ as was formerly supposed, but are in character predominantly 
instinctive and emotional.80  
Mental illness was therefore not responsible for the intellectual state of the individual; an 
emotional person was predisposed and more likely to be mentally afflicted because of 
their lack of reasoning and intellectual abilities. A “failure of an act of adaptation” is the 
concept that an individual is not necessarily as advanced or evolved as others and that 
might come in multiple forms, not necessarily linked to intelligence, but indicative of a 
more emotional individual.  
Class and masculinity played direct roles in the construction of diseases. Higher 
ranks were associated with specific types of mental illness that touted the superiority of 
their higher education and breeding. Lower ranks were diagnosed with hysteria and 
treated accordingly, both in the hospital and in the military. Given this way of thinking, it 
is evident that any standardization of care could only be within groups in the class or rank 
hierarchy. It might have been possible to standardize diagnoses and care for officers, but 
social and cultural assumptions made it impossible to arrive at standards that took in both 
officers and other ranks.  
 
80 Smith, Shell Shock and Its Lessons, 71. 
28 
 
Homosexuality was also a challenge to the masculine ideal that was tackled in this 
exploration of weakness in shell shock. In L. Lattes’ article titled “Homosexuals in the 
Army,” he explores the concept of homosexuality and the front. Specifically, on the 
matter of morale, he considers it to be a straightforward argument for exclusion:  
A soldier’s sexuality must not in any way interfere with his military activities nor 
bring about any scandal to injure the morale of the troops. In as far as a 
homosexual is markedly effeminate, he is out of place in the army, for he is 
unfitted for the efforts and privations of war.81  
The author equates homosexuality to femininity and therefore relates it to any discussion 
or display of weakness. Shell shock was one such display that might mean a soldier was 
judged as either cowardly or honourable. The main factors that distinguished one from 
the other were time in service or wounds sustained. If a man had, in the opinions of his 
fellow soldiers, served his time on the front and knowingly put himself in harm’s way, 
coming down with shell shock or neurasthenia was simply a matter of time and he 
deserved to get off the front. If, however, a soldier had been recently placed on the front 
before succumbing to a mental affliction, he was considered weak and cowardly. The 
opinions of the men affected their medical officers’ opinions; cases arose where superior 
officers wrote to clarify the behaviour of a soldier and betrayed this opinion that fresh 
men were not fit or that they were not even involved in a shell explosion and therefore 
had no reason to be presenting with these symptoms.  
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In this case study, there were no overt statements or concerns about the behaviour 
of the soldiers with regards specifically to homosexuality. There were two cases in which 
officers were permitted to resign as they had lost faith in their ability to perform their 
duties after incidents with shell explosions. Lieutenant Frederick Gates and Lieutenant 
Raymond Massey were both permitted to resign after they lost confidence in their ability 
to perform their duties. Lieut Gates served in the CEF from 23 September 1914 to the 9 
November 1916 when he was struck off strength and then permitted to resign.82 
Lieutenant Massey was close to a shell explosion on 12 June 1916 and then admitted to 
hospital. He lost all confidence in his ability to perform his duties and was sent back to 
Canada. He would return to the war in Siberia for a short time later.83 Both of these men 
were in positions of power and their inability to perform their duties challenged the 
strong masculine ideal and strength of the upper ranks. As such, they were both ushered 
off the front and given time to recuperate. 
Another factor that contributed to the physician’s understanding of their patients’ 
mentality as being frail or strong was that “as members of a professional army, doctors 
readily identified with its shared culture and masculine ideals.”84 Male doctors were 
subject to the same social laws that defined masculinity for their patients, and in 
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accepting weakness in their patients they were implying that either weakness or 
femininity were inherent to masculinity. Holding their patients to social standards of 
masculine ideals protected their identities as much as it defined their patients’. If their 
patients were feminine and able to suffer from feminine illnesses like hysteria, so too 
could they; so too were they feminine.85 But, like with insanity, the understanding of 
masculinity had to expand to allow for lapses in otherwise respectable individuals. Dr. 
Fiona Reid in her book Broken Men: Shell Shock, Treatment, and Recovery in Britain, 
1914-1930 discusses the concept of the hysterical man and how some physicians 
attempted to expand the construct of masculinity by “acknowledging the exceptional 
conditions of the war.”86 M.A. psychology fellow F.C. Bartlett at Cambridge University 
in his book Psychology and the Soldier wrote that “In some cases it can be predicted with 
practical certainty that a man will suffer mental collapse or disorder if he is subjected to 
the train of trench-warfare under normal conditions.”87 These theories about man were 
more progressive in that they challenged understood social constructs of what it meant to 
be a Victorian or Edwardian man.  
All of these presumptions about masculinity might have been at work not only in 
the original diagnoses but in revised diagnoses. Diagnoses could stay the same or change 
between stations and hospitals as soldiers were moved from field hospitals and 
ambulances to general or stationary hospitals farther back from the front. Diagnoses 
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changed then as diagnoses change now; physicians do not always agree on the prognosis 
of a patient and when mental illness or affectation comes into play there is more room for 
opinion. A common factor that contributed to the changes of diagnoses was that as men 
were taken off the front, other symptoms worsened or dissipated. Lieutenant Gerald 
O’Grady was initially diagnosed with shell shock on 4 June 1916 at No. 14 General 
Hospital in Boulogne, but as he was moved to No. 7 Stationary Hospital in Boulogne, his 
physicians reclassified his shell shock status to a shell bruise of the spine on 13 July 
1916. As his more typical shell shock symptoms dissipated and physical symptoms 
associated with his spine arose, doctors felt that classifying him as mentally unfit would 
not be accurate.88  
There are also instances of physicians continuing to agree with previous accounts. 
In the case of Private Brooke, his insanity diagnosis was carried through from one station 
to another to his discharge. His symptoms stayed constant and, combined with his family 
history and a lack of physical symptoms to draw focus, they could not be ignored. 
Severity of symptom would seem to play a large role in how the men in this case study 
were diagnosed and eventually treated for their illnesses. 
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1.3 Post-First World War Observations About Mental Health 
Immediately following the war, physicians who had been busy at the front or in 
military and civilian hospitals caring for the ill and infirm released medical studies on 
their experiences and understandings of psychological illnesses gained during the war. 
Multiple medical texts emerged in the first few years after the war as physicians 
amalgamated and published their research on psychologically affected soldiers. Dr. 
Ernest Southard was one such author. An American neuropsychiatrist and 
neuropathologist, Dr. Southard was involved in early studies of shell shock during the 
First World War. In 1919, he released his book Shell-Shock and Other Neuropsychiatric 
Problems Presented in Five Hundred and Eighty-Nine Case Histories From the War 
Literature, 1914-1918. Over the course of his time overseas, he collated 589 cases in 
which soldiers were to some degree or another experiencing shock or shell shock.89 Sir 
Frederick Mott was another physician who was able to publish his experiences with shell 
shock during the First World. Dr. Mott was a neuropathologist, and was therefore in 
sympathy with physical as opposed to psychological treatments.90 Initially, he ascribed to 
the neurology way of thinking that considered all nervous ailments connected to some 
form of physical abnormality; whether the abnormality be in the body or the brain, it was 
physical alterations to the normal human anatomy that caused changes in mentality. By 
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the end of the war, Mott had expanded his definition of trauma to have either a physical 
cause or a psychical one. Physically caused trauma was considered: 
a concussion or “commotio cerebri” by direct aerial compression followed by 
decompression or by the force of the aerial compression blowing the person into 
the air or against the side of ht trench or dug-out; or by blowing down the parapet 
or roof on to him, causing concussion; or a sandbag hitting him on the hear or 
spine might easily cause concussion without producing any visible injury.91  
Whereas psychical trauma was classified as: 
The psychogenic factor is by far the most frequent and important cause of shock 
followed by a psychoneurosis, particularly hysteria. This factor is complex in its 
origin, being dependent in a great measure upon the personality of the individual 
soldier, his mental attitude, and bodily condition at the time of the shock (whether 
of emotional or commotional origin) which led to his collapse.92 
Shell shock or the psychoneurotic affliction that a soldier experienced during the war, 
Mott determined, was due to some combination of physical and psychical traumatic 
injury. Some were completely physical and some completely psychical, but most were 
some combination thereof. A by-product of this separation of terminology was to 
separate shell shock from other mental afflictions: “‘Shell shock’ is a useful term if it is 
limited to cases where there is definite evidence of a shell or bomb bursting near enough 
to knock the man down, or blow him up int h air and cause a temporary loss of 
consciousness.”93 After 1916 and the great unexpected loss of men to mental illness 
generally, and shell shock specifically, this desire to define shell shock emerged as a way 
to improve clinical practice but also as a way to distinguish real from false sufferers. 
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There was a condition separate from other mental conditions that Mott considered to be 
true shell shock, and if those individuals could be identified they were to have no less 
than six months’ leave from general service, if they were to return at all. Humphries 
explores the attempt of the RAMC and CAMC to limit the use of the term “shell shock” 
to only the individuals Mott describes as being worthy.94 “Army Form W. 3436 now 
accompanies the man with a description of the occurrence.”95 This form was to be 
completed by the physician or the soldier’s CO and signed to approve of the term “shell 
shock” being used. The precipitating incident had to be documented and sworn to. After 
the war, this understanding of shell shock persisted, but postwar studies demonstrated 
that the distinction could not be as cut and dried as military officials insisted it be. 
The diagnostic process was also influenced heavily by both neurological and 
psychological concepts of inheritance, intelligence, and eugenics. The study of neurology 
expanded rapidly over the course of the nineteenth century to discover the nerve and the 
neuron, and to postulate how exactly the brain works. The 1911 edition of the Canadian 
Medical Journal described the advances of scientists in the previous century as 
“increasing the knowledge of physiology, dealing with the functions rather than the 
structure of the organs in health, was naturally followed by the study of derangements of 
function encountered in disease – pathological physiology, or general pathology - and an 
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explanation of symptoms was sought for on this basis.”96 The author goes on to stress the 
importance of this stage in any inquiry; science, or at least medicine, had returned to 
studying the atypical anatomy to discover physiological causes as opposed to working 
from “a fixed anatomical position.”97 Environment and regulative mechanisms, such as 
hormones or defensive mechanisms through which the body interacts with its 
environment, became the focus of pathophysiology.98 
In the case of Lieutenant Vincent Maxted, the effect of this expanded 
understanding of neurology can be seen in his service file. However, it is also evident that 
the connection of the physical to the mental was unclear to physicians. On 16 June 1916, 
Lieut Maxted was shot in the left shoulder and sent to No. 14 General Hospital in 
Wimereux for treatment. After two weeks, he was transferred to No. 2 General Hospital 
to continue his treatment. However, while there he was also diagnosed with neurasthenia. 
In September, “he reported ill at Shorncliffe … with extreme pain in small of back, so 
that he was unable to stand for more than a few minutes and movement caused pain.”99 In 
March 1917, he was sent as Adjutant to the General Reinforcement Depot at Shorncliffe 
and carried on until 22 September, when he had a return of the condition, now with 
weakness of the legs. Upon examination for this final myalgia lumbago diagnosis, the 
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medical board determined that his injuries had been caused by service conditions, but 
also that Lieut Maxted had a family predisposition. On 7 July 1916 Lieut Maxted’s 
medical status was noted by a medical board: “ this officer suffers from disability noted 
above GSW left shoulder and neurasthenia and described in Army Form A. 45 a. Wound 
superficial, now healed. Has headaches, is restless, and sleeps badly. He has improved by 
will need some rest.” A month before doctors added a diagnosis of neurasthenia, Maxted 
was simply diagnosed with lumbar myalgia or lower back weakness and/or pain. The 
physicians took no note of his mental health, stating simply that “He says he cannot walk 
more than a few miles without back paining him,”100 implying that it was no longer a 
symptom that factored into his diagnosis or treatment. The military acknowledged that 
service had caused his injury, specifying “exposure and infection” as the culprits.101 
When it came time to review his condition, doctors disagreed and did not actually 
conclude that he was suffering from myalgia. Lieut Maxted’s file does not explore his 
diagnosis of neurasthenia beyond that one instance where his pain began to affect his 
demeanor, and one facility was at least suspect of that transition in health. He got some 
rest, as prescribed, and presented only with physical symptoms in his following medical 
case files.102  
Lieut Maxted demonstrates how difficult it was to walk the line between physical 
and psychological symptoms. At what point did one’s prognosis allow for its own mental 
 
100 Ibid. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Ibid. 
37 
 
diagnosis? In this case and at these hospitals, it was when a man typically and simply 
suffering from lower back pain began exhibiting headaches, restlessness, and poor 
sleeping habits. Why those were not indicative of his pain affecting his sleep and morale 
was not explained. One can presume that a departure from his usual personality was 
enough for his physician to consider him mentally affected. 
 
Conclusion: 
The diagnostic process was generalized and designed to function on a small scale, 
on a case-by-case basis. It was a generally inefficient process that was influenced by 
multiple external factors that did not support equalized treatment for all Canadian soldiers 
in the First World War.  
Medical theories surrounding mental health care before and during the war 
segregated patients into the intelligent and the weak. Galton’s eugenic theories that 
classified people into hierarchical races all capable of different things permeated how 
physicians thought about the insane. The theory that some people were genetically 
predisposed to mental illnesses like shell shock was factored into their diagnoses and can 
be seen in investigations into family history that list family members in asylums or as 
invalids with no explanation of how that relates to the patient. The implication is that 
patients with family who have mental illnesses were predisposed to getting shell shock. 
Ideas about inherent inferiority of races was another factor that played into perceptions of 
insanity, hysteria, and poor mental health. Dr. Tuke noted that immigrants had a higher 
incidence of insanity and poor mental health and lamented the extra strain it put on North 
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American asylums. He even went so far as to blame them for preventing North American 
asylum physicians from finding a cure for insanity. How physicians conceptualized 
mental health informed their decisions on how to classify and treat it, which contributed 
to a non-standardized health care environment. 
In its prioritization of military efficiency, the Canadian Army Medical Corps 
attempted to decrease the number of men sent off the front by restricting the diagnosis of 
shell shock. The initial practice of diagnosing all soldiers mentally affected by the war 
with shell shock was quickly revised as too many men were sent off the front for that 
reason. Patients then had to qualify for the diagnosis of shell shock and, even then, were 
not guaranteed to be sent off the front. The initial breadth of the term shell shock to 
encompass all mental afflictions associated with the front and then the subsequent 
restricted use of said term marked periods of highly controlled medical censorship, not 
standardization, that served to help the military diagnose fewer cases of shell shock while 
encouraging physicians to use more established terms.  
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Chapter 2  
2 Treatment. 
“Provisions had to be made for medical service alone to a force with a total 
strength of 3,500,000 men operating in every variety of country and climate.”103 The 
medical services available for the Canadian army in the First World War had to be 
extensive, prepared, and equipped to deal with any conceivable situation that would result 
in any known medical injury, and then be prepared and equipped to deal with the most 
likely. In examining fifty soldiers discharged for being mentally unfit and the treatment 
they received after their diagnoses, it is evident that there were multiple factors beyond 
the individual patient’s health that affected the treatment he received. First, all medical 
discussions took place under the umbrella of military efficiency. While treatment suffered 
from generalization or broad non-specific approaches as in the diagnostic process, what 
affected treatment more was an ever-present need to achieve peak military efficiency. 
The individual and his personal health was not the focus of the Canadian army; the 
army’s focus was its own fitness. Maintaining that was a priority that in turn affected the 
medical care that soldiers received during the First World War. Soldiers’ treatment was 
about restoring their strength and making them more resilient; it was focused on 
maintaining them as a military resource. Second, treatment was also dependent on the 
theoretical and ideological beliefs of the physician (psychology vs. neurology) - and 
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therefore the equipment they requested be in their hospitals.  Physicians had different 
conceptions of mental illnesses and how they should be treated; this resulted in different 
types of care for patients from hospital to hospital. Third, rank affected what was 
available for soldiers requiring treatment for mental health afflictions. While the 
Canadian army was not organized by class, it was still a rank-based system in which 
higher ranking personnel were separated from the more numerous non-commissioned 
officers and men. Officers’ rank and smaller numbers guaranteed them more specialized 
treatments than their lower ranking counterparts. In addition to rank affecting care, the 
simple fact that the Canadian army worked as part of the British army for the majority of 
the war meant that classism affected Canadian soldiers in a multitude of ways. All of 
these factors combine to create a military-centred system of treatment that was focused 
on maintaining military strength rather than an individual’s overall health and wellness, a 
doctrine that led to multiple clashes between the military and medical communities 
throughout the war.  
In the service files I have collected for this case study, treatments prescribed to 
the soldiers went largely undocumented. In their medical case sheets, physicians would 
typically record what disease a patient was admitted for, when, why, and how their 
condition was progressing. The focus was always on the status of the patient’s condition, 
the symptoms they were exhibiting, and their prognosis. Were they going to be staying 
longer, transferred to another hospital or depot, or discharged home? However, in almost 
every case file in this study, rarely would medical officers note what kinds of treatment 
the soldiers were receiving. For example, Private Charles Fallaize was admitted to 
multiple hospitals over the course of the war for shell shock, epilepsy, and hysteria 
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because of a head injury he received in the trenches in March at Ypres. On 12 June 1916, 
he was admitted to Bromley to be assessed for epilepsy, a diagnosis that would later 
change to hysteria as he had no history of it before the war and no family history of 
epilepsy. The physician described the accident in which a sandbag came loose during an 
assault on Canadian trenches and Fallaize was buried for an hour; five hours later, he had 
to march twelve miles, during which he collapsed, feeling sick. He spent several hours 
unconscious and was sent to multiple hospitals where he had as many as seven 
seizures.104 The focus of his assessments was his tendency to lose consciousness, his 
weakness, headaches, and his poor sleep habits; the documents did not detail any course 
of action the hospital was taking for his illness or treatments offered to him. The only 
mention of treatment outside of comments on sleep, food, and fitness, was that on 12 
June 1916 he was sent “to Ramsgate for treatment. Shell shock.”105 The main facility in 
Ramsgate was Granville Canadian Special Hospital which offered electro-therapeutic 
devices, radiant heat aparati, eau courante or running water baths, massage, gymnastics, 
dentistry, and x-rays to their patients.106 
To cite another case, Private Fred G. Bailey, while in the reserve trenches at the 
Yser Canal, was blown into the canal by an explosion and was hit with shrapnel in his left 
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arm. Three weeks later, he was sent to hospital as his left arm, back, and left knee had 
become extremely painful. At the Canadian Convalescent Hospital in Bromley, 
physicians took note of the history of his injury, the length of time he had been injured, 
and in which hospitals he had been treated before arriving there. They also took note of 
his eating, sleeping, and fitness levels. As for courses of treatments, they only specified 
that he had spent three weeks at the first hospital and two weeks at a second. What 
courses of treatment he received there were not noted in his file.107 These situations were, 
unfortunately, common in these case files; only rarely were there any mentions of 
treatments. This necessitated an investigation into the hospitals these men visited and 
what kinds of treatment were offered there for mental illnesses. In this chapter, case files 
will be referenced when they can provide insight into treatments men were given. They 
will be supplemented by hospital war diaries (primarily Bearwood Canadian 
Convalescent Hospital, No 7 Queen’s Canadian General Hospital, Granville Canadian 
Special Hospital, Moore Barracks Hospital, Bromley, and Craiglockhart) and first-hand 
accounts of physicians to give an overview of treatment for mental health afflictions, how 
the military and medicine debate played out on the ground, and the varied treatments 
Canadian soldiers received during the First World War. 
2.1 The Military and the Medicine. 
In this first section analyzing the treatment of First World War Canadian soldiers, 
the relationship between the military and the medical community will be explored to 
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reveal that military efficiency was the priority in treating patients. Treating 
psychologically affected soldiers was a combined military and medical effort. Because 
both institutions were authorities over the human lives in their care, what resulted was a 
tense relationship as medical care frequently came out subservient to the war effort. The 
necessity to maintain a strong and efficient military force often superseded the treatment 
of individual soldiers, a reality that can be seen in an examination of specific aspects of 
case files, as well as through an analysis of Canadian hospital records from the First 
World War.  
During the First World War, soldier fitness was a priority of all armies. Having a 
fit, reliable, and consistent fighting force was essential for victory as the war was proving 
to be more and more deadly and would obviously be much longer than originally 
assumed. As the war progressed, maintaining morale and overall fitness became 
administratively difficult due to an increasing number of psychological cases being taken 
off the front. Organizing transport and ensuring that space, staff, and equipment were 
available for all casualties was overwhelming. While these casualties were expected, the 
construction and staffing of convalescent camps or command depots to care for them 
outside of hospitals and facilitate their return to reserve corps was delayed.108 As a 
greater number of soldiers than expected were hospitalized in the first year of the war, 
their return to the front became a priority. Only when large numbers of injured soldiers 
congested hospitals and field ambulances did command depots emerge. Command depots 
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were created for two primary reasons: first, to reduce the likelihood that soldiers would 
reinjure and have to be hospitalized again; and second, to ensure that after their extended 
stay in hospital, these men were fit enough to return to duty and perform their jobs 
adequately. Expecting still-recovering men to move from a hospital bed to the front line 
was impractical. Before the creation of convalescent facilities, hospitals would be 
crowded with men too sick for the front but not sick enough to require hospital care, and 
reserve units became “burdened with men for whose care they were not designed.”109 
The solution to this came in the form of command depots and specialized hospitals, both 
of which served to avoid soldiers having to be sent back to general hospitals and to help 
facilitate their return to the front. Macphail notes that these command depots were 
officially referred to as convalescent camps 
They were equipped with facilities for electrical and massage treatment under 
medical direction, but mainly organized and controlled by military officers, with 
the object of hardening men by suitable exercises and graduated drill for return to 
active service at the front in a period of about six months.110 
Canadian command depots emerged in February 1917 after a campaign in Ottawa to have 
Canadian facilities available for treating Canadians was successful. Prior to this, Britain 
operated thirteen command depots that had space allotted for 45,477 men.111 At these 
command depots, men would receive training to harden them back up to face the front. 
They were taught “physical training, instruction in musketry, bombing, and bayonet 
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fighting. From these depots, men would be sent on “to reserve units of their various 
regiments and corps,” and ultimately to rejoin their lines.112  Command depots also 
served to alleviate pressure on the hospitals and take on the long-term convalescing 
patients in times of stress so that hospitals could open up more space for wounded men 
more recently off the front. Command depots were created out of necessity to better 
return men to the front and to permit hospitals to treat men coming from the front that 
much more quickly.  
Analyzing the macrocosm of the First World War, such as the construction and 
purpose of command depots and understanding the overarching necessities that drove the 
war effort, helps to illustrate how and why military efficiency took precedence over 
medical care. Historian Richard Holt approaches his analysis of the efficiency of the 
Canadian Expeditionary Force through a statistical lens that sheds light on the 
administrative aspects of waging a war. Pulling back from the day-to-day, individual case 
files, and hospital war diaries and supplementing that information with the realities 
brought forward by Holt is enlightening. Hundreds of thousands of soldiers were passing 
through the hospital system, in one way or another, and those interactions, 
transportations, and treatments had to be facilitated.113 Men had to be closely monitored 
to keep track of them as well as to prevent overflow and ensure availability in hospitals, 
reserve units, and command depots. To maintain a successful system in which soldiers 
could seek medical help and then return safely to the front required a strict, complex 
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system of procedures whose redundancies and frequent checkpoints regularly caused 
delays that prevented reinforcements from reaching the front in a timely manner, and also 
prevented soldiers from being transferred to and between hospitals. The cost of 
administrative delay was significant because such delays hampered the organization of 
entire armies. Not only did soldiers need to have the facilities and staff to diagnose, treat, 
and replace them but the paperwork had to be with them at each stop to permit or redirect 
soldiers accordingly.114 Holt masterfully demonstrates the truly massive efforts of the 
administration that existed behind the soldiers of the First World War to express how 
truly complex the system was. Wastage rates were a severe problem for Borden’s war 
administration; he had specific numerical goals he wanted maintained at the front. 
However, “with only 191,654 officers and men with the CEF at the end of December 
1915” combined with an “average monthly wastage rate for 1915 of 1918 men, the CEF 
would have to enlist 26 613 recruits every month to reach Borden’s [goals] by the end of 
1916.”115 The mechanics of trying to achieve this one goal can be seen downstream in 
how soldiers were treated overseas; for each soldier who could be salvaged, rehabilitated, 
retrained, and returned to the front, one less person had to be recruited, trained, and 
transported to the war front. Reducing work to save time, money, material, and men 
saved so much more to the military than just a single individual. Holt demonstrates how 
the military system was designed to uphold countries and function solely to permit them 
to continue fighting a war; the importance of the individual was negligible. 
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Where a patient was sent reveals a military system that was focused on keeping as 
many fighting men close to the front as possible. Convalescent camps were designed to 
ensure that men were well enough to be sent back to duty, which indicates that the 
Canadian military’s system of health was designed around perpetuating the war effort. 
Men were not sent back to Canada to get better; as long as they could potentially be 
returned to duty, light duty, or in some way support the war effort, they were kept in 
Europe. Most of the cases in this study align with the narrative that military goals took 
precedence over individual health. Their hospital records indicate frequent instances of 
being struck-off-strength and sent to one facility or another before being discharged back 
to duty, or to light duties as support, before reinjuring or aggravating a pre-existing 
injury, which might require them to be considered mentally unfit by a medical board. 
Some of these soldiers suffered from illnesses that were cured, such as venereal diseases, 
influenza, and bullet wounds. However, many of the soldiers in this case study who 
exhibited one form of mental illness at one point in the war would remain in Europe to be 
admitted to hospital or camp for the same or a similar mental health issue. This can be 
assumed as physicians at later hospitals would reference old wounds from which the 
soldier could have acquired these mental health issues. Historian Sir Andrew Macphail 
sums up the realities facing the administration of a medical system designed to serve 
millions of allied soldiers. In his 1925 book History of the Canadian Forces, 1914-1915: 
Medical Services he notes that by the end of the war, the medical services (British and 
Canadian) comprised “144, 514, officers and other ranks.”116 Those 150,000 men and 
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women had to be “trained, equipped, and administered” effectively so that those soldiers 
could be treated.117 The motivations of the individual physician, soldier, and person were 
superseded by a need to maintain a functioning military community that permitted Allied 
forces to wage war. 
As the war was progressing, rumours started to spread about the ineffectual 
Canadian Army Medical Corps. It was being suggested that the CAMC was being 
mismanaged to the detriment of the health of Canadian soldiers, and that did not sit well 
with the Canadian public. In response, Prime Minister Robert Borden sent an 
investigative team headed by Colonel Herbert Bruce to France. Although multiple points 
in the Bruce’s report speak to the lack of standardized care in the Canadian army and 
therefore in the CAMC, three sections can be highlighted to demonstrate how treatment 
was focused on military efficiency over individual health. First, the decision to operate on 
soldiers was not first and foremost a medical consideration. In his 1919 report Politics 
and the CAMC, Bruce mentioned that one of the issues preventing the Canadian Army 
Medical Corps from performing more than adequately was that “no attempt had been 
made to restrict the large number of [surgical] operations producing no increased military 
efficiency.”118 He further specifies that “the only military justification for operations for 
minor disabilities is the resulting improvement in the efficiency of the soldier, and after 
two years of war, definite conclusions ought to have been reached in regard to the 
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desirability of many operations which were still frequently performed.”119 These 
operations were also only supposed to be performed by medical officers with sufficient 
experience. Bruce’s goal in this section was to identify soldiers whose performance could 
be improved through minor operations, separate them, and operate on them to return 
them to duty. If, however, a soldier required a relatively minor operation, but his post-
operative prognosis suggested no improvement in his ability to perform hos military 
duties, then it should not be performed.  These soldiers would either be considered for 
discharge to light duties or discharge to Canada as a means of reducing the number of 
surgeries performed and reallocating the hospital services to other soldiers who could 
benefit from surgery, in the sense that after recovery they would be able to return to full 
duty.  The application of these policies meant that minor disabilities affecting soldiers but 
not directly their ability to perform meant that their overall health was not the priority but 
maintaining the strength of the army was.  
Second, “the installation of an expensive plant at Ramsgate was inadvisable, as a 
large number of the cases treated there should have been sent to Canada for 
treatment.”120 Home to multiple hospitals during the war, Ramsgate was the previous 
location of Granville Canadian Special Hospital before it was moved to Buxton, and was 
also the home of the Princess Patricia’s Red Cross Hospital. Bruce outlines his dismay 
with military procedures that involved sending a soldier back from the front to various 
treatment facilities and the creation of stationary hospitals designed to deal with severe 
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cases that could no longer be returned to the front; he considered all of this to be a waste 
of space, time, money, and personnel. While the creation of specialized hospitals worked 
to the advantage of patients with more complicated prognoses like shell shock, keeping 
the men overseas was still catering to the needs of the military as opposed to making the 
health of these men the priority. Keeping them in England was keeping them close to the 
war, treating them while at the same time maintaining the possibility of one day returning 
them to the front. Patients were sent to Granville for “joint injuries, nerve lesions and 
contractures, shell-shock, neurasthenia, and amputations cases,” and Bruce asks why 
those afflicted with serious cases of these ailments be kept in Britain when better long-
term care could be given back in Canada.121 With cases of nerve and joint injury 
specifically, operations that required orthopaedic intervention were best done in Canada 
where “after-treatment and re-education measures” could be properly undertaken.122 The 
other issue with housing shell-shock and neurasthenic patients at Granville in Ramsgate 
was that the town was the frequent site of Zeppelin visits and bombings.123 Had quality 
of patient care been the priority for the military, a specialized hospital to treat shell 
shocked, neurasthenic, and other nervous war-affected patients would not have been 
established in a city that was frequently bombed. Space, staff, and equipment were 
available there and that was relevant.  
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A final significant conclusion in the Bruce Report was a “lack of co-ordination in 
the Canadian Medical Services between Canada, England, and the front.”124 Specifically, 
Bruce’s issue was that neither the examination of patients nor the administration of 
Canadian hospitals overseas had enough coordination to function under the same 
principles of medicine: “As regards to the examination of the men, there was no common 
standard.”125 It was being noticed that soldiers declared capable enough to be discharged 
to Canadian command depots or the front by one hospital or medical board were being 
retained at Canadian bases elsewhere as other physicians considered these soldiers unfit 
for service at the front. This occurred frequently between Canadian medical boards in 
Canada, England, and France126.With different stations defining fitness and wellness 
differently and their medical boards operating according to these definitions, it did not 
just matter what you were diagnosed with, what symptoms you were presenting with, and 
what courses of treatment you were offered. It also mattered where you were released to 
and what those medical officers believed about your condition.  These differences created 
problems with respect to care as well and military efficiency. A soldier’s condition would 
be treated, or not treated, depending on where he was sent, so soldiers received different 
levels of treatment for the same illnesses. If a soldier was considered fit for service by a 
Canadian hospital in England, but not by a Canadian hospital France, then his ability to 
return to duty was compromised and he had to be replaced by another body. The Bruce 
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Report’s identification of a lack of standardization in Canadian military medical care and 
call for that to be corrected is strong evidence that while the military may have been 
moving towards generalized care, it was prioritizing military goals over the health of 
Canadian soldiers. 
In addition to the military prioritizing efficiency and maintaining unit strength over 
individual health and wellness, the impact of the military on health care can be seen in 
preparation for major military offensives. In the hospital records for No.7 Queen’s 
Canadian General Hospital, the author notes that hospitals would prepare for large 
numbers of casualties on the eve of planned assaults.127 This meant that space, staff, and 
equipment had to be freed up and made available for incoming wounded. For standard 
admission in times of relative calm during the war, patients coming to Queen’s would be 
identified by their wound type - chest, knee, head, infectious etc. - and then sent to those 
wards. Mild cases would be given a shower-bath, food, and a change of clothes before 
being sent up to their ward whereas urgent cases would be assessed by medical officers 
upon arrival and treated accordingly. The reasoning behind this, the author explained, 
was “it having been proved that sleep, stimulated by warm soup or cocoa, is the best 
preliminary to subsequent care.”128 The author further states that many men who were 
shaken or considered shell shocked upon arrival would, after an evening of rest, food, and 
calm, be much improved the next day and even qualify for quicker transfer back to a 
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command depot. What would interrupt this routine was preparation for offensives such as 
the Somme or Vimy Ridge.  “The week prior to these engagements our hospital was 
emptied to the last possible man, our operating theatres, wards, and dressing centres were 
piled high with reserves of gauze and dressing. With all our machinery in readiness we 
wait in anticipation.”129 Moving patients to command depots or convalescent homes in 
preparation for an assault is indicative of military efficiency taking precedence over 
individual care. Hospitals had to be opened and space had to be made for more serious 
cases; cases that had already had a chance to convalesce could be transferred to command 
depots or discharged in favour of a new patient who might have a better chance to 
rehabilitate fully. Macphail mentions that American hospitals, in times of increased 
workload, relied on recruiting more medical staff: “the surgical teams were obtained by 
stripping the base hospitals of their staffs.”130 To avoid reducing staff at surrounding 
hospitals, the British and Canadian medical services opted for moving patients and 
amassing the necessary resources before major engagements got underway. “Owing to 
the considerable number of patients still arriving from the various lines, it is necessary to 
evacuate patients to either convalescent homes or elsewhere at the rate of 60 patients per 
day.”131 This was the note that Lance-Cpl Scott made in the No. 7 Queen’s Hospital war 
diary on 8 December 1915.132 That year, Canadians had fought in the Second Battle of 
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Ypres and the Second and Third Battles of Artois and the sheer number of wounded was 
weighing heavily on general hospitals.133 To cope, they were sending patients away to 
open up beds so that more recently wounded patients could be assessed and treated. 
Throughout 1917, Moore Barracks notes in its war diaries that at multiple points 
throughout a month, it would send patients, around twenty at a time, to the Military 
Convalescent Hospital in Epsom to convalesce.134 There was nothing to imply that these 
patients returned or were retrieved from said convalescent stay; they did not even record 
these patients’ names, implying that they were sent to convalesce permanently. In this 
case, those requiring specialized care were the mental health patients and Moore Barracks 
would send their “mental cases” to Lord Derby War Hospital in Warrington.135  These 
were the only two groups of patients mentioned when discussing large groups being sent 
out of the hospital in these war diaries. At the No 7 Queen’s, it was noted that “in times 
of stress, when casualties are numerous, the transfer of large numbers of patients is still 
carried out-though, ordinarily, severe cases are detained at casualty clearing stations near 
the trenches.”136 Military offensives and their aftermath took precedence over 
convalescing patients; it was a system of triage and if a patient was well enough to walk, 
he was well enough to return to the front or at least be moved out of a hospital where a 
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more serious case could be treated in his stead. Complete rest was neither the goal, nor 
was it possible for patients in military hospitals as long as the war was on. 
Space, having enough beds to house and treat patients, was a problem that multiple 
hospitals faced throughout the war, and dealing with this problem while best treating 
patients was difficult. The constraints placed on hospitals by the war prevented soldiers’ 
individual health from being the priority of health care work. This can be seen first in the 
types of treatment offered by hospitals to incoming, non-urgent injured; rest, food, and a 
bath to help calm and reassure the soldier that danger was no longer imminent. Second, 
this can be gleaned from what physicians recorded in medical history case sheets. The 
soldier’s condition was the focus: when they became ill, and whether or not the incident 
could be tied to a pre-war cause or not. What a soldier was treated with and how that 
treatment affected them beyond being normal enough for discharge was rarely a concern. 
Soldiers who could have been sent home for optimized treatment with family were not; 
they would by rehabilitated overseas, at least enough to be sent back to the front and 
maintain unit strength. Soldiers in hospital were transferred out as major offensives 
brought increased numbers of casualties to hospitals, all of whom needed beds recently 
occupied by soldiers still recuperating.   
2.2 The Effect of Rank of Treatment. 
The Canadian army was a system based on rank and not class, it operated as a part 
of the British Army for organizational purposes and was therefore subject to levels of 
classism amongst the Canadian ranks. However the CEF, while it was based on a military 
rank structure, claimed to be less classist. Historian Jonathan Vance discusses the 
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experience of classism and the encouragement of anti-classist attitudes in the CEF in his 
book Death So Noble. “Tolerance, unity, devotion to duty, fair play, the sharing of 
burdens – these had been the watchwords of the CEF.”137 In an attempt to revitalize 
Canadian society to become “worthy of its heroes,” Canadians looked to the Battles of 
Ypres and Vimy Ridge, where  Canadian soldiers united in a spirit of “tolerance and 
cooperation.”138 Canadians wanted to emulate and support these ideals of equality and 
unity over the economic and class divisions of the past.139 Canadian classism was 
experienced but was actively fought against as national unity became more important 
during the war. However, Canadian soldiers were still affected by a system constructed 
around treating officers and non-commissioned officers and men differently. One 
example where rank affected soldiers was in different treatment centres. Macphail notes 
that a number of small medical facilities called minor hospitals arose in England 
throughout the war, each capable of treating from 25 to 25 soldiers at a time. The care for 
these men was supplemented by the army at 2 to 4 shillings per day per patient. “The 
majority were in the Shorncliffe area and were annexes to the Shorncliffe military 
hospital. For officers only: ‘the Limes,’ Crowborough; Helena Hospital, Shorncliffe; 
Perkins Bull Hospital, Putney Heath; and Norwood Hospital for nursing sisters at 
Buxton.”140 There were hospitals available for NCOs as well, but the fact that they were 
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separated suggest at minimum that rank was a factor that divided the soldiers and affected 
their care. How it affected treatment will be expanded upon in this section.   
Until 1917, the CAMC operated administratively under the British Royal Army 
Medical Corps. This meant that Canadian-trained and employed medical officers were 
not being used to treat Canadian soldiers exclusively but were sent to locations where the 
British needed supplementary medical personnel. In Herbert Bruce’s 1927 Politics and 
the CAMC, he notes that halfway through the war, “the personnel of the CAMC, with a 
few exceptions, had not been engaged in the care of the Canadian sick and wounded.”141 
Approximately 1350 Canadian medical officers were in fact dispatched to the 
Mediterranean despite no Canadian troops serving in that theatre at that point in time. In 
France and England, where Canadian facilities had been set up to treat Canadian sick and 
wounded, the CAMC was only rarely treating Canadian sick and wounded there as 
well.142 Andrew Macphail and Herbert Bruce allude to a political debate happening in 
Ottawa from the beginning of the war regarding this issue of Canada being subservient to 
British control. Some Canadian politicians believed that Canada should be representing 
itself in all aspects of the war; Canada should not simply be another dominion at the 
beck-and-call of the British Empire. Other Canadian politicians believed that Canada and 
Canadian soldiers abroad would function best under the guidance and with the resources 
of Britain as it was waging a war.143 A large part of this debate that singled out the 
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medical services specifically was the Bruce Report. “The organization and system of the 
Canadian Army Medical Service began to be the subject of criticism within a few months 
after Canada’s troops became an actual factor in the prosecution of the war.”144 
Criticisms arose to the point where Canada felt the need to send an envoy to Europe and 
investigate the CAMC and report back and offer suggestions to improve its efficiency. 
Colonel Herbert Bruce was chosen as he was a prominent Canadian surgeon who was 
also a “professor of Clinical Surgery at the University of Toronto and Surgeon to the 
Toronto General hospital.”145 He had also been a president of the Toronto Academy of 
Medicine and fellow of the American Surgical Association and possessed numerous other 
distinctions alongside holding the rank of Lieutenant Colonel in the CAMC.146 For three 
months, Bruce was overseas investigating the CAMC; he reported back to Ottawa by 
September 1916 with many controversial observations: the allocation of Canadian 
medical officers to serve other wounded needs despite the desire of Canadian men to 
remain together and be treated by medical officers they were familiar with; and the 
problem of “taking over fifty-seven small V.A.D. (Voluntary Aid Detachment) hospitals 
in the Shorncliffe Area, at a time when the entire Toronto General Hospital Staff was 
lying idle at Shorncliffe.”147 Shorncliffe hospital had the staff to care for more patients 
and could handle incoming surgical cases from the battlefield whereas the VAD hospitals 
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were outfitted primarily by nurses who, “though devoted and enthusiastic, had no 
adequate training to  deal with such casualties.”148 The nursing staff relied on local 
civilian doctors, while Canadian surgeons whom Bruce considered eminent were  
“standing idly by,”  a clear misuse of resources.149 What Bruce brought back was a report 
on the poor performance of the Canadian government in the organization and care for 
Canadian lives. Its suppression was attempted, but the Bruce Report became public 
knowledge and debates played out in newspaper columns demanding explanations of 
Prime Minister Borden. A 7 February 1917 edition of Montreal’s The Gazette outlined 
the back-and-forth between the Canadian and British Parliaments, Dr. Bruce, and Sir Sam 
Hughes, Canada’s former Minister of Militia and Defence. It ended with a declaration 
from the government that friendship between Canada and Britain would be maintained, 
but a grudging agreement with the Bruce Report findings.150 It would take until 1918 for 
Bruce’s policies to be fully enacted.151 In total, Bruce outlined twenty-three issues with 
how the army organized the medical services to the detriment of the soldiers and 
recommended fourteen steps to ameliorate the situation. 
Ultimately, in 1917, Canada made the decision to pull the CAMC out from 
complete British control, a decision that manifested itself clearly in the operations of the 
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medical services. Canadian hospitals were established that would be geared towards 
Canadians treating Canadians. Macphail notes in his 1927 book History of the Canadian 
Forces that Canadian leadership should have looked to American organization of medical 
services prior to separating their system from the British; he noted that because of their 
operational isolation, Americans suffered from understaffing of medical personnel: 
“operating surgeons were on duty for 72 hours, some base hospitals organized for 500 
men patients were forced to take 2,100 and practically all cared for 1,500 while some had 
3,000 or more.”152 The Chief Surgeon said that the one reason the American medical 
surgical system survived was that in times of increased workload, “the surgical teams 
were obtained by stripping the base hospitals of their staffs.”153 Both of these conditions, 
overworked hospital staff and pulling staff from other facilities essentially rendering 
them without medical officers, had negative effects on patients and therefore negatively 
affected the war effort. According to Macphail, the armistice kept the American medical 
service from collapsing under the strain; he suggested that the Canadians could expect a 
similar outcome.154 Operating overseas, in England, and on the European continent, 
Canadian services would have done best to navigate these new contexts with the 
expertise and resources of the British Empire. The Canadians therefore chose 
independence and self-sustenance over cohesiveness and subservience. 
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Historian Ben Shepherd makes an important point in his book A War of Nerves that 
officers and non-commissioned officers were offered care in different facilities and that, 
despite the fact that rest away from the front was essentially the same from one place to 
another, some soldiers perceived this segregation as different levels of care. Whereas 
officers were typically sent to specialized hospitals, non-commissioned officers and men 
were more likely to be sent to convalescent homes, asylums, or to hospitals with a higher 
number of patients to care for that were therefore unable to provide more specialized 
treatment.155 Alongside the fact that officers had the option of going to smaller 
convalescent facilities because British families in northern England opened their home as 
convalescent destinations for officers, there was also the fact that British physicians were 
officers in the British army and themselves propagators of rank disparity. Dr. William 
Rivers was a British psychoanalyst who took some cues from Freud to help expand 
psychology’s treatment of war neuroses. Rivers considered Freud’s proposition that 
sexual desires were at the root of mental health issues to be wrong. However, he accepted 
that dreams helped to connect a person to their inner, subconscious desires and could help 
to treat shell shocked men.156 Rivers believed that treating men with electrotherapy as a 
means of convincing them that they were not ill was torture. In that way he was a 
sympathetic character who functioned on the idea that patients got better because they 
believed that their doctors could make them better. Convincing a patient to believe in him 
helped him overcome their fear that they were incurable, and his psychotherapy 
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progressed from there. Despite his psychological approach, Shepherd notes that Rivers 
still found it difficult to deal with patients outside his class;  being at Craiglockhart, a 
hospital for those of his class with whom he could communicate intelligently, he felt 
more capable.157 The role of the physicians to treat all indiscriminately was not a role 
traditionally fulfilled by physicians. They too brought their prejudices to their practices, 
some more so than others, and that had an effect on their patients and how they were 
treated. 
Class disparity affecting the treatment of First World War soldier can be seen in 
hospital war diaries. Granville Canadian Special Hospital was an 800-bed hospital 
located in Ramsgate, Kent, that specialized in treating soldiers afflicted with nerve and 
bone injuries. While officers and men were both being cared for at Granville, specific 
entertainments were organized for officers and to which men were not admitted. One 
such event was described on 29 January 1918, when Mrs. Dent and other ladies of the 
town organized a “drive” in the smoking room, specifically for officers.158 Coffee and 
cake were served at this party for officers only. This was not an uncommon occurrence 
nor was it unique to Granville. Hospitals that treated mixed ranks would have specific 
events organized for the officers and larger events for all patients.159 While excursions 
from convalescent camps and dinners should not be considered as direct treatment, they 
did constitute specialty care that encouraged segregation amongst the ranks.,  
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2.3 Just What the Doctor Ordered. 
In every medical faculty, in every large community, there are persons who profess 
to have acquired special skill in the various departments of surgery and in the 
treatment of certain diseases; but one might have all skill in opening a cavity, in 
setting a bone, in repairing an organ of the special senses, or watching a fever, and 
yet be quite incompetent in the wide field of human activity, known as war, that lies 
beyond his ken.160 
This quote from historian Andrew Macphail exemplifies the contested relationship 
between the medical and military communities during the First World War; a doctor 
could set a bone but did not know what it took to win a war. Treatment for mental 
illnesses or afflictions during the First World War was affected by multiple external 
factors such as rank and military efficiency. Another major external factor that impacted 
the treatments a soldier received, touched on in the previous section, was the hospital he 
was sent to and the physicians who were stationed there. Different physicians in the 
CAMC and RAMC, and in civilian hospitals used by Allied forces during the war 
ascribed to different methods of treatment, ideologies of care, and theoretical approaches 
to medicine. These differences in approaches resulted in specific hospitals being able to 
provide specific types of care, which in turn generated different levels of dissent and 
approval from the military. This section will focus on the differences between hospitals 
and hospital groupings to demonstrate that, alongside rank and military goals, where a 
soldier was sent as a patient altered what kinds of treatment he could access. 
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 It would be a mistake to imagine that all military hospitals during the First World 
War were similarly equipped, either in terms of the personnel or the diagnostic and 
treatment tools. Even something as fundamental as an x-ray machine was not universally 
available. Discovered in 1895 by Wilhelm Rontgen, the x-ray was a relatively new 
technology that was not readily available everywhere; there were also relatively few 
individuals trained in its operation.161 Furthermore, x-ray rooms were large, because the 
radiographer and other patients required extensive protection behind concrete walls that 
involved a great deal more construction than was possible for some facilities. Moore 
Barracks Hospital was without an x-ray machine until 1916, despite housing up to 800 
patients at a time. As a solution, Moore had to send patients to Shorncliffe Military 
Hospital for x-rays. However, in late 1915, Shorncliffe Military Hospital was taken over 
by No. 3 Casualty Clearing Station [CCS] a unit that had no radiographer, which meant 
that neither hospital had access to x-rays as they had no physician or radiographer to take 
and interpret the images.162 
The story of Moore Barracks Hospital’s x-ray services applies to all other 
equipment and personnel matters, including those involving soldiers diagnosed with 
psychiatric conditions. Not every hospital had the same specialists with the same 
approaches or tools to use in treating psychiatric patients, so how a soldier was treated 
depended very much on where he was sent. But where he was sent depended not on the 
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facilities available at any given hospital, but space. The soldier went to a specific hospital 
because it had space, so he ended up getting the treatment that the specific hospital was 
able to provide, whether or not it was the treatment that the soldier actually needed. By 
the same token, the soldier would be treated by the specialists at the hospital with space, 
rather than by a particular specialist who might be better suited to his condition. This was 
particularly significant given the wide range of opinions among doctors who specialized 
in psychiatric cases.  
2.4 Psychology and Neurology. 
Macphail notes that the contest between medical officers and military personnel 
lasted throughout the course of the war, pitting physicians who tried to expand and adapt 
care against the military, which enforced a system of care that supported the 
rehabilitation of soldiers to rejoin their units so that their numbers could be maintained. 
Historian Ben Shepherd explores the evolution of early treatment of shell shock in his 
book A War of Nerves. In his chapter on shell shock in France, he describes the work of 
Dr. Charles Myers and his efforts as a medical representative working against military 
doctrine. Leading up to the war, Myers was a lecturer in experimental psychology at 
Cambridge University.163 His experimental psychology explores the motivations and 
awareness of the Self and its symbiosis with the unconscious. It also works alongside 
physiological and neurological theories to help push science’s understanding of the 
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nervous system. He criticizes ideas about these hard sciences, implying that there are also 
unanswered questions in their specialty as there are in psychology. Psychology is also not 
free from Myers’ criticisms. In his book An Introduction to Experimental Psychology, he 
explores the importance of the uniqueness of personality and while each brain may be 
constructed similarly, they operate to serve each individual’s needs. This individuality, 
the person, had to be at the center of psychological inquiry as opposed to focusing on the 
average so as to understand the differences between minds and the reasons behind those 
differences.164 In 1916, Myers was appointed a consultant psychologist to the British 
army where he worked to “alleviate the crude treatment, both military and medical, of 
psychoneurotic cases” and would be a key figure in the identification and treatment of 
shell shock.165 In 1917, he was the first physician to write in The Lancet, a British 
medical journal, using the term shell shock.166 He explained that there were both physical 
and psychological causes, predisposing conditions, and that ultimately shell shock was a 
disorder that affected the conscious and the unconscious personality which could present 
as functional disorders like poor “intelligence, memory, movement, sensation or 
reflexes.”167 
To get the Army to acknowledge shell-shock as something distinct from the 
traditional categories of wounded, sick, well or mad and to provide separate 
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facilities for its treatment in France, so that ‘innocent men who had mentally 
broken down under the strain of warfare’ were not flung together with the 
genuinely insane, epileptics and criminals, or put into general wards with wounded 
soldiers.168 
After a year of advocacy, at the beginning of 1917, specialist facilities for the treatment 
of shell shock were created in Boulogne and back in England.169 Myers was of the 
opinion that most men dealing with shell shock were just “badly shook-up or temporarily 
confused.”170 Myers was a patient advocate who believed in a shift away from asylums 
as the established treatment for soldiers with mental health issues because “by treating 
soldiers as if they were mad, the Army was often pushing them into genuine insanity.”171 
Separating soldiers based on their illness or ailment helped for organizational purposes, 
and removed stigma from fellow patients and staff not specialized in mental health care. 
Giving patients a safe space to heal was the basis for hospitals away from the front; 
Myers was simply taking that logic a few steps further. Myers would go on to push for 
further improved treatment of shell-shocked soldiers by petitioning the army to treat men 
earlier on in their medical journeys to improve their prognosis. Proximity to war was the 
immediate problem and if a man could be distanced from it early for a period of 
recuperation, then he was more likely to return to the front rather than be discharged to 
light duties or to hospital in England. Myers advocated for a triage system of mentally 
affected individuals to keep them from congesting general facilities that could not 
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adequately treat them anyways.172 More hospitals, convalescent, and rest stations in 
France were the solution in his mind. Despite this, Shepherd notes that most cases of 
shell shock and mental affliction were still just returned to England where they stayed for 
lengthy periods of time.  
In addition to contending with military opposition and orders, there were also 
multiple instances in which members of the medical community disagreed amongst 
themselves. Typical of most academic communities, medicine was not always in 
agreement on how best to treat an individual but in the context of war, this made progress 
in medicine that much more difficult and the consequences that much greater. Shepherd 
makes this intra-medical conflict clear in his discussion of Myers by addressing the 
opposition to Myers’ ideal of rest, relaxation, and distance from the front to treat those 
not necessarily afflicted with shell shock but whose nerves were just fraying. Some 
believed that encouraging female visitors, providing too many entertainments, and 
distracting relaxations discouraged the soldier’s return to the war; essentially, the action 
of making life outside the army look too good for a soldier off the front was dangerous 
and only encouraged him to stay in hospital. “Rest in bed and ample encouragement is 
not enough to educate a child. Progressive daily achievement is the only way whereby 
manhood and self-respect can be regained.”173 Opposing arguments came from the 
medical military personnel who were more intimately acquainted with army life and 
believed that the need for discipline over comfort did not stop just because men were 
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hospitalized and that seeing a hospital as an escape instead of just another military 
institution was detrimental to soldier morale and motivation. In sum, medicine could no 
longer navigate treatment alone. It had to frame treatment in the context of war and weigh 
the pros and cons of treating one soldier over another instead of ensuring that each person 
received the time, care, and space necessary.  
Another aspect of intra-medical disagreement was the neurologist’s and the 
psychologist’s theoretical and subsequent practical approaches to treating shell shock. 
The conflicts arising in how to treat patients with shell shock between the psychological 
and neurological communities were contentious and depended heavily upon diagnosis, 
symptoms, and the continued manifestation of those symptoms. Psychology itself was a 
newer field containing multiple ideologies regarding the treatment of mental health. Once 
such popular approach pioneered by Sigmund Freud was psychoanalysis, which took 
many forms during the First World War in the treatment of the mentally affected. Among 
the accepted practices for treating military mental health patients were 
sedation, restraints, isolation, psychotherapy, physical therapy, and ultimately sending 
them home or to an asylum where they could be perpetually isolated and sedated to keep 
from harming others and themselves (assuming the soldier could not be salvaged from his 
mental illness. Poor mental health was for a long time considered a permanent 
debilitating disease that put others at risk or generated discomfort; therefore, segregation 
was a popular choice. With the increasing awareness that those people who were not 
expected to suffer from poor mental health -- upper classes and powerful individuals -- 
actually were as vulnerable as anyone else, ideas of the permanence of poor mental health 
started to shift towards the belief that it was curable. Psychotherapy and alternative 
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treatments to isolation, restraint, and sedation promised and saw hopeful results. These 
shifts occurred in the mid to late-nineteenth century and were encouraged in the early 
twentieth. During the First World War, when manpower was a limited resource that had 
to be recycled as efficiently as possible, mental health could no longer always be a life 
sentence for a soldier, a reality that encouraged further policy and treatment adaption. 
Could mentally afflicted soldiers be rehabilitated adequately to keep fighting? Both 
neurology and psychology found in this question a niche in which to expand their 
research.  Psychology focused on causation to discern a cause of poor mental health, 
which in turn resulted in the exploration and focus on fear. Shepherd quotes David Eder, 
a British psychologist during the First World War, concerning this crippling and mind-
altering fear that incapacitated soldiers. Eder was not alone, and a lot of psychological 
treatments came to involve an analysis of fear in some way. Eder operated on the theory 
that 
The unconscious, acting on behalf of the ego sets the eye watering, forcing [the 
soldier] to relinquish his post. Then the soldier’s instinct reasserts itself, the eye 
ceases to water and he returns to the loophole. But here the egocentric instinct, self-
preservation, reasserts itself and the unconscious adopts a stronger attack. He is 
stricken blind in the shooting eye… He is now unable to carry out his conception of 
the soldier’s duty and, without loss of self-respect is able to retire, his safety 
guaranteed.174 
 
This quote explores the build-up of fear in the soldier to the point of inaction or illness as 
a form of self-preservation. The result is mental affliction and some level of inability to 
perform the duties of soldiers, with fear as the root cause.  
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These ideas are echoed in F.C. Bartlett’s 1927 Psychology and Soldier. After the 
war at Cambridge University, Dr. Charles Myers, formerly the Official Psychologist to 
the British Expeditionary Force in France, and Lieutenant Colonel L. H. Thornton, then 
director of Military Studies at Cambridge, held courses “on psychology in relation to 
military problems.”175 Bartlett, who led these lectures from 1921 to 1927, presented this 
book as introduction to the role of psychology in a soldier’s life. According to Bartlett, 
fear was the central and constant factor in mental health. Fear becomes normalized as it 
becomes part of the soldier’s everyday existence; it is a constant, where before it was a 
passing feeling. This shift towards normalization happens gradually and is expected. 
Bartlett explains that normalization of a work environment is natural; in a regular job 
back home, a man would be striving for raises or promotions but at war, a man becomes 
accustomed to vying for promotions of rank that includes the added responsibility of 
men’s lives. This is one stage of normalization. Another is that men in one’s unit die 
frequently and violently. The normalization of death takes a toll on the psyche of the 
soldier.176 These normalizations combine to create a psyche more suited to war. 
Ultimately, Bartlett makes the point that the normalization of war is not the problem but 
when fear becomes increasingly attached to all normalized processes, it becomes 
overwhelming and the soldier has a mental breakdown.  The association of fear with 
other war front actions, such as manning the trench or even holding a gun, has to be 
broken. Therein lies the treatment; what is associated has to be dissociated, to permit a 
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soldier to return to the trenches without the overwhelming fear of death. This underlying 
theory of needing to separate the soldier from the front and the fear can be seen in a 
myriad of treatments, from merely sending a soldier to a convalescent hospital to 
electrotherapy, trying to untangle the brain from trauma, at the heart of treating the 
mentally afflicted men.177 
Tackling the fear behind shell shock took many different approaches as different 
psychologists acknowledged it as an important hurdle to overcoming shell shock. Some 
physicians believed that to cure it, the patient had to be convinced that he was going to be 
cured before the treatments had even started. For Lewis Yealland, this came in the form 
of a good reputation to encourage a patient to believe that his doctor had the ability to 
heal him. To reinforce that, he would use electrotherapy as a disciplinary measure. 
Historian Mark Humphries notes that like hydrotherapy and other physical treatments, 
electrotherapy was used “to provoke a sensory reaction that would help convince the 
patient that symptoms of anesthesia or paralysis could be alleviated” as a form of 
disciplinary treatment.178 The use of physical shock to assist the patient in believing that 
he could be cured was a common practice of Yealland’s at Queen Square hospital. This 
was part of his psychological approach to convince patients that they could be cured 
before even starting treatment. Yealland found conflict in his field in that, while a soldier 
was with him receiving treatment, he did appear to be improving. However, as soldiers 
filtered through his hospital and returned to the front or to another hospital or home, they 
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were likely to relapse. Yealland was also criticized for his excessive use of electrotherapy 
on patients. If a patient had a history of resisting his suggestion that electrotherapy would 
help or appeared to be losing faith, Yealland would increase the amperage to get the 
patient to yield mentally as opposed to actually curing any illness. Dr. William Rivers 
was on the other side of this. While he agreed with Dr. Yealland’s approach in needing to 
convince the patient that he could be cured by his physician, he was strictly against using 
physical stimuli to reinforce that belief and to force a result.179  
Neurological treatments for shell shock and other psycho-neurological illnesses 
were more traditional and therefore accepted by the medical and military communities. 
The nervous system had come to be understood as an electrical circuit and nerves the 
harbingers of electric energy. Its failings were functional, not mental, and that was also 
an attractive attribute that had more physicians and professionals turning to neurology 
over psychology. It was believed that the introduction of electric current to muscles could 
gradually help to increase blood flow and ultimately return strength and movement to 
shaky, inappropriately active, or paralyzed limbs. Electroconvulsive therapy was not used 
in the First World War. In the 1930s and by the Second World War, electroconvulsive 
therapy would become a popular treatment for the mentally affected. In this treatment, a 
patient would be put under general anaesthesia and then an electric current would be 
applied to their brain to trigger brief seizures.180  
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In the First World War, electrotherapeutic methods centered around Galvanism and 
Faradism. Discovered in 1791, Galvanism is the creation of an electric current through 
chemical catalysts. This electrical current was then applied to tissues to induce a 
contraction/convulsion of muscle, not to the brain to induce seizures; simple and 
controllable electric currents were used to contract, then relax a muscle to simulate 
natural muscle movement.181 Faradization is the use of alternating current electricity or 
AC electricity on the body. Galvanism uses direct current or DC electricity. Faradizing 
alternating current is generated electromagnetically as opposed to chemically. According 
to E.M. Magill’s 1917 Notes on Galvanism and Faradism, the use of electricity in 
medicine had been an established practice for years.  
The constant current, because of its beneficial effects upon metabolism, was used 
for the following conditions, when it may be applied to the whole body as a hydro-
electric bath, or especially to the nervous system: insomnia, neurasthenia, general 
debility, hysteria, rickets, anaemia, other constitutional diseases.182  
In the early days, before current electricity or electricity in motion was applied to 
pathological conditions, shocks from a static machine were given for muscular wasting; 
paralytic cases were more usually treated by Galvanism and Faradism by the First World 
War.183 Instead of using pulses or using the person as a way to complete a circuit of 
“moving” electricity, simple and instantaneous shocks were administered to 
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neuromuscular systems.184 Nevertheless, exactly what electricity was, the author makes 
clear, was still unclear to the general public at this point and therefore its applications 
were largely experimental. 
Magill’s notes make clear that they were writing not for a scientific readership, 
but for masseuses and others who wished to practically apply Galvanism and Faradism in 
their therapeutic practices. Masseuses would come to be employed in hospitals like 
Granville to help in the rehabilitation of neuralgic patients. In a 1916 book review in the 
American Journal of Surgery, the journal’s publishers commended E.M. Magill for this 
instructional book. Not only did they applaud the clarity with which the author conveyed 
major theories involved in the application of Galvanism and Faradism, but they 
recommended it to “medical schools, and to house surgeons and other who may be in 
need of concise but practical guide to electrotherapeutic treatment.”185 It permitted the 
use of electrotherapeutic techniques without having to be specially trained in electrical 
engineering.  
 For mental diseases, the manual recommends the use of sinusoidal baths where 
the patient is immersed in a bath, an electrode using alternating current is placed at their 
feet and arm.  The probe positions are switched halfway, and the current is increased to 
comfortable tolerance of patient.186 Depending on what a patient was diagnosed with 
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determined whether Galvanism, Faradism, or ionic electric treatments were the solution. 
For neuralgia, the manual recommends the use of galvanism and/or quinine or salicyl 
ions.187 For neurasthenia, the manual recommends that if blood pressure is high, use high 
frequency, and if blood pressure is low, use static electricity. If the patient is suffering 
from insomnia, central Galvanism was the recommended treatment. For neuritis, the 
manual recommends the use of acute-anodal stabile galvanism and or subacute salicyl 
ions. Given the number of diagnoses each patient would pass between, those with access 
to electric treatments could have received any number of them, rendering it impossible to 
be specific about how these treatments were organized. When electrotherapy was applied, 
minimal results were noticed, and improvements were more likely to be temporary. 
Standardized application of electrotherapeutics was attempted and can be seen in manuals 
like Magill’s. However, given the fact that diagnoses were different between medical 
institutions and not all institutions provided the same equipment and level of care, 
treatment could at most only be expected to be standardized within an institution and 
potentially with other close institutions.  
In examining the case files, few examples arise in this study in which physicians 
stated specifically what specific treatments a soldier received. Most case files mention 
physique, fitness, and heart and lung status, and would indicate where a soldier was being 
sent to infer the type of treatment he was receiving. Major Herbert Graham Starr is one 
case in which his specific treatments were recorded in his medical case sheet. Major Starr 
was an engineer from Maple, Ontario, who enlisted into the CEF on 9 September 1915. 
 
187 Ibid. 
77 
 
On 17 September 1916, he was admitted to No. 7 Stationary Hospital in Boulogne for a 
shell shock wound. The very next day he was sent to No. 4 London General Hospital 
where he stayed until 28 November 1916, when he was discharged back to duty. A few 
months later he presented to Granville Special Canadian Hospital in Ramsgate on 2 
February 1917 for sciatica problems in his lower back. He stayed there until 19 April 
1917. In July and August 1917, he returned to Granville and then to the Canadian 
Convalescent Hospital for Officers for “sciatica (railroad spine)” and neurasthenia 
respectively.188 At the CCH, doctors specified that a shell explosion knocked him into a 
wall and compressed his spine, resulting in the lumbar pain as well as extreme shakiness. 
He went back and forth between these two hospitals, receiving Faradism and massage 
treatments as well as light duties to test how much he could do before being overcome 
with pain. He was then transferred to the Furness Hospital in Harrogate for sciatica from 
where he was discharged 4 January 1918. He returned to Canada on the SS Chiselhurst 
from Liverpool on 26 February 1918.189 In the case of Major Starr, for his railroad 
spine/sciatica/shell shock, he received electrotherapy, x-rays, heat treatments, and 
physical massage to treat his pain. Because it was not lessening and he was also 
presenting with poor memory, dizziness, palpitations, and extreme nervousness, he was 
struck off strength on 6 June 1918 in Ottawa. However, he would be listed as a 
demobilization discharge and not a mentally unfit discharge. This case demonstrates that 
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officers had the option of being sent back to the home front and still remain in the army 
despite being mentally unfit. 
Conclusion: 
The treatment of soldiers was provided by and through a military system that 
promoted efficiency, strength, morale, and success. Once a soldier was diagnosed with an 
illness, he was sent to a facility that treated him. The goal of treatment was to restore the 
soldier’s fitness and ability to fight, so that he could be returned to the front. This is seen 
in how soldiers were sent back to hospitals, how they were treated, the expansion of the 
convalescent facilities and command depots, and the fact that soldiers were kept in 
Europe to try and rehabilitate them at all costs before sending them back to Canada. How 
the mental health of the soldier was accommodated in this system of military health care 
can be seen in the push-back from Canadian medical officers as well as in the likelihood 
of a soldier reinjuring himself; Canadian soldiers wanted to be treated by Canadian 
physicians, physicians pushed for humane treatment methods, and soldiers who had been 
in hospital once for shell shock, neurasthenia, myalgia, hysteria, and debility were 
extremely likely to appear in multiple hospitals, stations, and camps throughout their 
service. Military priority directed the medical community’s methods of care, as made 
evident by hospitals implementing procedures to empty their beds as much as possible 
before major offensives to make room for more soldiers. 
Treatments mentioned in the men’s service files were vague and focused on their 
physical fitness: how the patient looked, ate, slept, and their overall behaviour. What 
treatments they were receiving, outside of general convalescence, were not reported. The 
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only exceptions in this study of men receiving specialized treatments like massage, 
electrotherapy, and heat apparatus treatment were officers.  These treatments were 
offered at convalescent stations that housed both officers and men and yet there is no 
mention that men received specialized care. If physicians were including these types of 
treatments in the files of officers and not men, was this indicative of specialized treatment 
only being used to treat officers? Rank and class affected the treatment of soldiers; 
treatment for soldiers was not standardized, and was not even equally available. Officers 
had facilities open to them that men did not, and their files reflected closer attention to 
mental health and nervous care. Officers also had the privilege of being sent back to 
Canada for rest without needing to be considered unfit. This disparity in health 
experience demonstrates a lack of standardized treatment. 
Military efficiency was a driving force behind the types of treatments officers and 
men received. In the beginning of the war, the term shell shock emerged and was 
liberally applied by any medical officer in the field or hospital. Hospitals were the 
primary care station for men and the CAMC administered care to whichever soldiers the 
British army needed it to. As the war progressed and casualties mounted, the need for 
convalescent spaces and command depots arose and the term shell shock was restricted to 
prevent as many soldiers being sent back and also to diminish the number of soldiers 
presenting with mental affectations. The emergence of these stations and restrictions was 
to better serve the military’s need to maintain men on the front lines through 
rehabilitation stations that would gradually reintroduce them to the front while 
simultaneously opening up hospital space to permit better triage procedures. Canada was 
at war and that meant that the medical military personnel were responsible for 
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maintaining the health of the force to win the war. This caveat of needing to support the 
military machine resulted in a lack of adequate mental health care for soldiers as well as 
an uneven distribution of available resources.  
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Chapter 3  
3 An In-Depth Analysis of First World War Canadian Service 
Records. 
The previous two chapters have explored major themes that influenced the 
diagnostic and treatment practices during the First World War for Canadian soldiers and 
made it difficult for those practices to be standardized. The first chapter takes the 
common adage that with the First World War came advancement and improvement, 
which included a process by which medicine and treatment were standardized. It 
analyzed how, at the diagnostic level, this was not true. Rather, the Canadian military 
focused on generalized medical care, which did not mean that care was standardized. It 
looked at the inconsistency in diagnostic practices between hospitals, the inconsistent 
nature of the neurological and psychological medical communities leading into the First 
World War, and finally the almost constant shifting of diagnostic practices to privilege 
military efficiency over individual soldier health. The second chapter looks at the 
treatment of fifty Canadian who were admitted for psychological affectations. More 
closely, it identifies military need as the driving force behind where a soldier was sent for 
recuperation, when, and why. Rank also affected Canadian soldiers in that the lower 
ranks were not given as lengthy or specialized care as officers. Finally, this chapter looks 
into how different doctors with different ideological beliefs with regards to mental health 
offered different treatments for the patients they received at their respective hospitals; 
care was different based on the facility to which you were sent. An individual soldier was 
not the focus of the health-care system employed by the CAMC during the First World 
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War; it was in fact a system of health centered around maintaining strength at the front, 
morale, and fitness. If men could be rehabilitated to the point where they could be 
returned to the war, they were. If this meant using them for light duties instead of trench 
fighting, that was still a body saved to maintain strength against enemy forces.  
3.1 Case Study #1: Private Frederick Bailey and Private Thomas 
Essery. 
A contrast that was touched on in the first chapter, but not fully explored, was the 
differentiation between shell shock and neurasthenia by the medical community during 
the First World War. Initially the diagnosis of shell shock was thought to be adequate and 
was applied liberally to all soldiers who exhibited a kind of nervous behaviour. 
Eventually, however, the men who fell into the category of shell shock became too varied 
to treat so some degree of classification had to be established. Neurasthenia, an already 
common condition by the time of the First World War, was readily applied to soldiers 
who were exhibiting shell shock symptoms but who did not incur physical injuries in 
battle. It also came to be applied to soldiers who were shelled but who did not display the 
neuro-typical symptoms of shell shock such as shakiness, tremors, nightmares or bad 
sleep habits, and nervousness.  Gastritis and headaches as well as non-conformist or poor 
behaviour were all common symptoms of neurasthenia. Two case files that exemplify the 
fluctuating and transient definitions of shell shock and neurasthenia are Private Fred G. 
Bailey and Private Thomas Essery. Over the course of the war, both men would be 
diagnosed with shell shock and then have that diagnosis shift to neurasthenia.  
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In his 1887 book Functional Nervous Diseases Their Causes and Their 
Treatment, Dr. George Stevens discusses neurasthenia in conjunction with nervous 
problems due to spinal irritation: “They are characterized by general loss of nervous 
energy and by local symptoms more or less complex; certain symptoms, however, 
prevailing more in one than in the other form of nervous disturbance.”190  Specifically, 
with  
neurasthenia in men there is less of the neuralgic element, with more dull pain in 
the extremities, or general sense of exhaustion, inability to continue at office-
work where writing or attention to accounts is required, and frequently a general 
sense of illness which prevents the patient from following his usual avocation or 
even confines him to his bed. These cases have been known as neurasthenia.191  
These were vague symptoms that reduced an individual no longer able to perform tasks 
or duties that they previously could. Therefore, during the First World War, when 
patients showed up to hospital with symptoms that generally prevented them from doing 
work, they could be easily classified as a neurasthenic. In their 1921 book The Form and 
Functions of the Central Nervous System, An Introduction to the Study of Nervous 
Diseases, Dr. Frederick Tilney and Dr. Henry Riley built on the idea that neurasthenia is 
related to nervous energy, but modernized it; neurasthenia was simply “a condition 
characterized by loss of nerve strength.”192 The concept of strength in nerves or nervous 
energy being necessary for a person to function indicates that neurologists were still 
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trying to understand exactly how the nervous system worked. They could only really 
tackle when it was malfunctioning by trying to treat the symptoms; galvanism and 
faradism, electricity applied to muscles groups to simulate contractions as a way to 
regulate muscle spasms, were the most common interventions. 
Private Bailey was a 36-year-old cook from London, England, who enlisted into 
the Canadian Expeditionary Force on 11 September 1914 at Valcartier, Quebec. 
According to his personnel file, “while in the reserve trenches at the Yser Canal, about 1 
April 1915, [Pte Bailey] was blown into the canal from the explosion of a shell.”193 At 
the same time, a light shrapnel wound was inflicted about the middle of the left arm. How 
he was retrieved from the canal and what treatments were administered in the field were 
not detailed in his file. However, it was noted that his “clothes dried on him,” which 
resulted in his getting chilled.194 Three weeks after this incident, he had to be carried out 
of the trenches as he was experiencing a great deal of pain in three major extremities. 
After receiving hospital treatment for rheumatism at the Canadian Convalescent Hospital 
in Bromley, Kent from 5 June 1915 to 22 June 1915 he would be discharged back to his 
unit. His file notes that he was on duty until 2 June 1916 when a bombardment 
overwhelmed his unit and he was buried.  On 9 June 1916, Pte Bailey presented to the 
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No. 3 Division Rest Station with symptoms of shell shock and was so diagnosed. Five 
days later, he reported from base to rejoin his unit.195  
 The next month, on 13 July 1916, he presented to No. 9 Canadian Field 
Ambulance with pyrexia and gastritis.196  Pyrexia is simply a raised temperature, 
essentially a fever. In Dr. Stevens’ Functional Diseases, Their Causes and Their 
Treatment, he mentions how in cases of neuralgia or nerve pain, “pyrexia sometimes 
accompanies the paroxysms” or the potentially violent emotional outbursts from the 
patient.197 Violent, emotional outbursts become a part of the illness as the pain increased 
or was unpredictable. Stevens and his contemporaries believed that there were no telltale 
symptoms of the individual being affected by this neuralgia: “while some sufferers from 
this complaint are ruddy and apparently in robust health, others are exceedingly anaemic 
and feeble to an alarming rate.”198 This vague explanation of nerve pain and those 
affected by it made the diagnosis of neuralgia easily to apply to many soldiers who were 
presenting with symptoms of what might be considered shell shock or neurasthenia.  Any 
individual expressing pain in association with a wound could be diagnosed thus, 
regardless of their general demeanor. However, in Bailey’s transition from shell shock to 
neurasthenia, despite the clear indications of pain, there was no transitional diagnosis of 
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neuralgia. Instead, the physicians described his condition as feverish and suffering from 
gastritis. 
Gastritis, or inflammation of the lining of the stomach resulting in abdominal 
pain, was not considered to be a symptom of shell shock generally but had historically 
been associated with neurasthenia and neurasthenics. Much like what exactly would 
come to define shell shock in the First World War was continuously disputed, what 
defined neurasthenia was also inconsistent and hotly debated. Dr. Gilbert Ballet, a 
prominent Parisian physician who worked out of the Hotel Dieu Hospital, published a 
book in 1909 called Neurasthenia. He argued that, although many physicians had tried to 
clarify the etiology of neurasthenia, most were operating solely on part-truths and 
therefore had little valuable information regarding prophylaxis or therapeutic treatments 
for neurasthenia.199 Ballet explains that physicians had frequently connected the “the 
different symptoms of neurasthenia, to some lesion or functional disorder of the stomach 
or of the other abdominal viscera.”200 Many scientists at the time were exploring the 
theory that “neuropathic states had either gastritis or dyspepsia for their origin.” 
However, the author and his colleagues, while coming to the conclusion that there was 
indeed a link, could not say that all neurasthenic cases had gastric origins. In fact, 
dyspepsia was more likely a symptom than any kind of cause.201 If, however, the patient 
was exhibiting gastric issues as well as neurological ones, the physician would be right to 
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treat the neurasthenia by treating the gastric problems.202 Gastritis was only considered a 
supposed link to neurasthenic states.  
On the other side of this debate were physicians like British doctor Thomas Dixon 
Savill, who published his findings that linked gastric disorders to neurasthenia in his 1908 
book Clinical Lectures on Neurasthenia. Savill determined that 102 out of 157 
neurasthenic cases at the Hospital for Nervous Diseases “were associated in some way 
with symptoms of gastric disorder.”203 Forty-six of the 102 cases had some gastric 
disorder from one to seven years before becoming neurasthenic.204 Only twenty-eight of 
his total cases had acquired a gastric disorder during or after neurasthenia; he does not 
specify how long after. To explain why some cases had a longer onset than others, Savill 
suggests that mental trauma, overwork, and strain were the contributing factors that 
resulted in neurasthenia in his patients in conjunction with the gastric disorders. Further 
proof of the connection between gastric disorders and neurasthenia came when Savill 
indicated that “as the digestion was gradually relieved, the neurasthenia began to 
disappear, even without any remedy directed to the nervous system.”205 In his 1911 
edition of Neurasthenia, Ballet still maintained that the neurasthenic/gastric connection 
was still just supposed, and that it was to deliberately misunderstand the neurasthenic to 
equate the incidental symptoms like gastritis with constant ones indicative of a 
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disorder.206 Pte Bailey, previously presenting with shell shock symptoms, was now 
exhibiting symptoms more commonly associated with neurasthenia, according to his 
physicians who ascribed to the notion that gastritis and gastric problems were highly 
associated with neurasthenia. This would be a contributing factor to his being diagnosed 
as a neurasthenic later on.  
On 22 July 1916, Pte Bailey reported from base to rejoin his unit, evidently 
requiring little or no convalescence from his hospital stay before being sent back to his 
unit. On 15 August 1916, a medical board reviewed his condition as it stood after being 
sent to Monks Horton, to ber treated for acute articular rheumatism; he developed 
rheumatism in his right ankle and complained of palpitations. The physicians found that 
there was no organic lesion of his heart and that there was no evidence of rheumatism in 
his right ankle.  On 25 October 1917 he finally set sail from Liverpool, England, for 
Canada. In the proceedings of the medical board at the discharge depot in Quebec City, 
the reason for his discharge is given as neurasthenia. It notes that he had a history of 
rheumatism and that he was also evacuated from France for shell shock. His present 
condition was that he was now “rather pale and complains of indefinite pains in the back 
while lying down. He is 45 years of age and fairly well developed.”207 They also noted 
that his heart and lungs were normal. His degree of incapacity was considered to be 10%, 
a disability that would last at least 3 months. The medical board did not consider any 
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special treatment or appliance to benefit him, but just recommended time at home to 
rehabilitate. This was signed 1 November 1917.208 
On 30 November 1917, his Medical History of an Invalid sheet expanded upon 
the reasons for which he was discharged: rheumatism, palpitation, and dyspnea 
nervousness. His rheumatism originated May 1915 and his palpitations and dyspnea 
nervousness in June 1916; both were acquired in France. The cause of his rheumatism 
was determined to be exposure on service, while his other ailments were put down to the 
strain of service.209 His condition as of November 1917 was 
Slightly anaemic – face rather pasty appearance; complains of some pain in 
lumbar region: cannot ben over and touch toes: has palpations, is nervous and 
tremulous – sleeps poorly; appetite indifferent: frequent headaches: some swelling 
in feet at night/ Urinalysis 1012 – no albumen – no sugar: slight dyspnea: lungs 
and heart normal: moderate general debility.210 
It would not be until 27 February 1919, when Pte Bailey reported to the Military hospital 
in Toronto with symptoms of neurasthenia, that discussions would begin about the 
possibility of his being discharged as medically unfit. Ultimately, this board 
recommended that Pte Bailey be “placed in Class E., and be allowed to pass under his 
own control – further treatment not being indicated.”211 The information listed by this 
medical board conflicts in multiple ways with the other medical information available in 
Pte Bailey’s file. First, the medical board reviewing his case in Quebec had noted that his 
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experience with rheumatism had started in 1905, before the war. Another physician could 
not even detect a rheumatic flare up when he presented with pain in his ankle, supposedly 
due to rheumatism. Why the board concluded that his rheumatism was acquired from 
service during the war was not explained. Another aspect of this discharge form that 
conflicts with previous information in Pte Bailey’s file is that his heart was considered 
normal and yet palpitations, alongside dyspnea nervousness, were a contributing factor to 
his being discharged.212 Dr. J. Abrams, a Toronto consulting physician and electro-
therapist, in his 1895 book Electricity: Its Mode of Action Upon the Human Frame, and 
the Diseases in Which It Has Proven Beneficial, discusses heart palpitations with regards 
to nervous origins:  
Though sometimes connected with organic disease of that organ, [palpitation of 
the heart] is far more frequently a mere symptom of some disordered state of the 
body or mind, such as dyspepsia anaemia, nervous debility from sexual excesses, 
protracted nursing, late hours, insufficient rest, or the excessive use of coffee, tea, 
or alcoholic stimulants.”213 
Dr. Abrams recommends Faradic current “applied to the upper and middle portion of the 
spine as well as to the epigastrium” for treatment.214 For these illnesses, Pte Bailey 
received medication and hospitalization in France and England. The sources do not 
specify what type of treatment he received, but they do indicate that he would likely not 
benefit from any further treatment beyond time away from the front. Moderate general 
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debility was his final diagnosis.215 He had shifted from shell shock to neurasthenia to 
debility, the diagnostic shift from one illness to the next was based upon symptoms he 
was expressing. Had he been at a different hospital, his physicians could have easily 
diagnosed him with neuralgia or even myalgia and lumbago instead. 
Private Thomas Essery was a 30-year-old moulder from Oshawa, Ontario, when 
he enlisted into the Canadian Expeditionary Force. He was married to Dorothy Ella and 
together they had four children: Helen, Dorothy Isabell, Reha, and Cecil. On 14 February 
1916, he enlisted in Brantford, Ontario, in the 125th Overseas Battalion of the CEF. On 3 
November 1917, Pte Essery was admitted to 21st Southern General Hospital in 
Birmingham with shell shock. From there he was transferred, on 21 December 1917, to 
Granville Canadian Special Hospital in Buxton.216 He would stay at Granville until 20 
June 1918. Initially, he was admitted to hospital on a straightforward diagnosis:  
Patient is giving history of being wounded May/17 and being buried Sept/17. 
Before being buried he had difficulty in carrying on, after being buried he found 
himself with short breath, poor sleep, bad dreams, stuttering and trembling, and 
showing all the symptoms of ordinary shell shock.217 
Over the course of his stay at Granville, Essery’s physicians noted that this condition 
continued to improve. His sleep was more consistent and lasted for greater lengths of 
time, his appetite was good, and he was sleeping well and “without dreams.”218 On the 
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advice of his medical officers, however, it was determined that should he return to 
general service, his improved condition would deteriorate; he would revert to displaying 
symptoms of shell shock, resulting in his return to hospital or even to Canada. While 
soldiers were sent to convalescent and command depots in between hospitals and 
returning to their units, there was also the realization that even with physical 
rehabilitation, some soldiers could not expect to be returned to the front no matter the 
level or types of treatments they were receiving. Unless the soldier’s prognosis was 
judged to be hopeless, he was sent to hospital, and rehabilitation attempts could span 
years. Granville was a special hospital outfitted to accommodate multiple types of 
treatments for dealing with shell shock or any other exhaustion or mental health-related 
problem that necessitated at least some convalescence. It was equipped with radiant heat 
apparatuses, electro-therapeutic apparatuses, massage, and orthopaedic gymnastics 
alongside other more recreational convalescent treatments like concerts, visits to nearby 
towns, and arts and crafts activities.219 Many soldiers in this study found themselves 
staying here for long periods, sometimes having to return for treatment and 
convalescence. 
 Like Pte Bailey, Pte Essery’s first status reports on his health, from November 
1917, focused on his present condition which no longer reflected shell shock symptoms; 
with both men, there was a clear physical improvement which physicians took to mean 
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that they could no longer be said to have traditional or “ordinary” shell shock.220 A chest 
report in Pte Essery’s file explains that he was coughing a lot, mostly in the mornings and 
evenings, and that in conjunction with this he was experiencing a tightness in his chest 
and dyspnoea, or difficulty breathing, after walking short distances. Ultimately, doctors 
ruled that there were no physical problems with his chest and that his lungs sounded 
normal. This report, alongside other observational conclusions, suggested that his illness 
was becoming more mental than physical, which resulted in a shift in his diagnosis. The 
shift from shell shock to neurasthenia was not necessarily indicative of a lack of physical 
health issues but demonstrated that physicians could use the terminology fluidly 
depending on what criteria the patient did or did not meet. Some patients were nervous 
with tremors in their extremities and still some physicians would only diagnose them 
neurasthenic. Diagnoses were applied to the patient as the physician saw fit based on 
their own theoretical and ideological practices; because many and varied practices existed 
during the war, there could not be any standardization with regards to diagnosis. 
 According to Pte Essery’s Medical History of an Invalid form, completed at Park 
School Barracks on 16 October 1916, doctors considered his original disease to be shell 
shock due to his having been blown up while in service. Like Pte Bailey, Pte Essery was 
no longer considered shell shocked but neurasthenic. By way of explaining this shift in 
diagnosis, the doctors elaborated further in his present condition section: “when excited 
or disturbed by noise, becomes nervous, confused, dizzy and develops a headache in back 
part[. A]t such times must lie down and if quiet will pass […] in an hour or so. Worse 
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several months ago. Improving.”221 According to the physicians, Pte Essery’s objective 
present condition was: 
Well developed, well nourished, adult. Nervous, sluggish in his movements, slight 
incoordination in movements and jerky movements of hands, and fingers. Fine 
incoordinated tremor of hands. Reflexes slightly exaggerated. Heart and lungs 
normal. Incapacity due to partial loss of function of nervous system due to shock 
from bursting shell.222 
The two assessments indicate that physicians believed he was progressing to an 
acceptable level of physical fitness; he was fit, fed, and relatively normal. The only 
biological system affected was the nervous system; he had no disability according to his 
physician’s objective analysis. He had no dyspnoea. His disabling condition was 
expected to last 6 months and, unlike with Pte Bailey (in whose case doctors 
recommended he return home and be given time as no treatment was likely to help), Pte 
Essery was advised to seek hospital treatment of “10 months for neurasthenia.” This 
document was completed 8 November 1918.223 A recommendation for further hospital 
treatment initially seems severe, but in the context of the hospital as a place for 
rehabilitation during the First World War it suggests a more positive prognosis for Essery 
and his future as a rehabilitated soldier.  
Private Bailey and Private Essery’s files reflect instances in which soldiers were 
diagnosed with shell shock, and then later diagnosed with neurasthenia. The reasons 
behind this, medically, were that they no longer presented “ordinary” symptoms of shell 
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shock.224 As the war progressed, the cases of shell shock increased during 1916 to the 
point where the military pursued redefinition, restriction of diagnosis, and alternatives to 
shell shock and enforced them upon the medical community. Pte Bailey and Pte Essery’s 
case files are representative of this shift away from shell shock. At first it had to be 
proven that they were involved in incidents that were likely to produce shock; they were. 
Then the transient nature of shell shock symptoms became a target; if someone was not 
exhibiting nervousness, tremors, shakes, poor sleeping habits, poor nutrition, and nervous 
affectation then they should not be treated for such things, and their diagnosis should 
reflect this change in behaviour and experience. The fact that many soldiers would revert 
and return to hospital after being discharged, even the war, indicates that although 
symptoms were transient, mental affliction was not. Reducing a disease or illness to 
symptoms expressed reflects a medical and military system focused on rehabilitation as 
opposed to standardized medical care. 
3.2 Case Study #2: Lieutenant Raymond Massey and Lieutenant 
Frederick Gates. 
The second chapter explored how rank affected the treatment of NCOs and other 
ranks as opposed to officers. While the CEF was not a classist organization, because it 
was involved with the British Army, rank separation and segregation had a similar effect 
on Canadian soldiers’ treatment as classism did on the British Army. Officers had access 
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to facilities that housed them in much smaller numbers and, in the case of convalescent 
homes especially, would not reflect a typical hospital environment but a more 
comfortable one. Large houses were converted at the request of wealthier families living 
in the countryside, and officers came to convalesce there. Even in institutions that treated 
officers and men in England, such as the King’s College Hospital or the No. 4 London 
General Hospital, there were a certain number of beds reserved for officers. There were 
approximately 300 beds reserved for officers in No. 4 London General, one quarter of the 
total number of beds reserved for men.225 Even in specialized units such as tuberculosis 
and mental health units, officers were separated from men.  
An example of an officer from this case study receiving specialized or abnormal 
treatment concerns Lieutenant Raymond Hart Massey.  A student from Toronto, 
Lieutenant Raymond Massey was only eighteen years old when he enlisted in the 9th 
Battery, Canadian Field Artillery. On 18 June 1916, Lieut Massey was admitted to No. 4 
London General Hospital, Denmark Hill, for neurasthenia. Unlike the medical case sheets 
for most NCOs in this study, Lieut Massey’s intake medical case sheet file was empty 
save a signature from an unknown captain indicating that Lieut Massey had been seen 
and his condition approved of by a medical authority.226 What has been observed as 
typical of soldiers having suffered from a form of shell shock or neurosis and been sent to 
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a medical facility is an explanation of the incident, the present and objective conditions of 
the soldier, and sometimes a mention of family history, or any kind of status update on 
the patient over the course of his stay in hospital. That Lieut Massey had no explanation 
or record of his care suggests it was not necessary. According to a note dated 20 June 
1916, 
This officer suffers from disability noted above (shell shock). He was admitted to 
No. 5 Red Cross Hospital, at Wimereux, on 12 June 1916 and was there for a 
week. Was admitted to No. 4 General Hospital, London on 19 June 1916. He has 
lost all confidence in himself; thinks he will never be any good and dreads going 
back, and he is very nervous and shaky. Sir B. Dawson, A.M.S., considers this 
officer requires a complete rest. A change and sea voyage would greatly benefit 
this Officer.227  
Sir B. Dawson AMS [Army Medical Services] was in fact Lord Dawson of Penn and 
“physician-in-ordinary” to King George V. Dr. Dawson became a major-general in the 
RAMC, assumed a baronage, and became active in the House of Lords in the 1930s.228  
Dr. Dawson was also the doctor who tended to King George V on his deathbed. The fact 
that this highly educated and well connected physician would treat Lieut Massey is 
indicative of Massey’s rank as well as the importance of rank in treatment.229 Massey’s 
family was a prominent one from Toronto. His brother, Vincent, attended Oxford with 
William Lyon Mackenzie King and would eventually become Canada’s eighteenth 
governor-general.230 Dr. Dawson’s recommendations for Massey are indicative of their 
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shared social rank; no private would be sent on a sea voyage just to improve their 
constitution. That an officer had lost confidence in his abilities to perform his duties, 
however, was problematic and would require either convalescence or discharge. 
Wimereux and No. 4 London were common destinations for officers afflicted with 
shell shock in this case study. Lieutenant Frederick A. Gates would be sent to Wimereux 
and then subsequently to No 4 London as would Lieutenant Wilfred Holloway. Lieut 
Holloway had been posted to the Ypres Salient. He was shelled and experienced 
subsequent nervous and nerve tissue problems in his back and legs that required some 
rehabilitation. He spent two weeks in Wimereux before being transferred to No. 4 
London General Hospital in Denmark Hill. Physicians analyzing his case determined that 
he would not be fit for general service at this point and would require at least 2 and a half 
months’ rest. They also determined that this “disability [was] contracted in the service” 
and that he had no control over the circumstances under which he contracted it.231 
Specifically, his shell shock was caused by a shell explosion. Lieut Gates was also a 
visitor of No. 14 General Hospital at Wimereux and then was transferred to No. 4 
London General Hospital in Denmark Hill before being discharged to Canada. Lieut 
Gates was at Wimereux for a week, and at No. 4 from 4 July 1916 until 9 August 1916. It 
is unclear if his transfer to Shorncliffe Military Hospital was just for a Medical Board or 
if he was sent there and then permitted to return to Canada.232  
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On 23 June 1916, Massey was permitted to leave for Canada. At that time, 
Massey was not necessarily considered mentally or medically unfit for service but was 
permitted to leave based on his belief that he could not adequately perform his duties. A 
medical examination was conducted on this officer, according to the procedure for 
soldiers wishing to be relieved of duty. It stated that his physique was good, his nutrition 
was good, and his heart, arteries, vision, and hearing were normal.  Regarding the state of 
his physiology, doctors considered that all systems were functioning normally, without 
any affliction acquired at any point in his life, except his nervous system.233 Later, the 
physician expanded on this by saying: “Shell shock July 1916 full recovered, no 
disability due to service.” This assessment was performed in Toronto on 12 May 1919. 
Massey had served 15 months.234 
Outside of these medical case sheets, little is understood about Lieut Massey’s 
condition. He was nervous and multiple references in his files indicate that he had 
tremors. The only other pages in his service file are pension and payment information 
that do not provide any more insight into his condition. His illness began in May 1916 
and it was noted in his file that despite his wounds, he chose to stay on the front and is 
therefore deserving of convalescence. A month later, he was hospitalized, and then 
proceedings began for him to be treated and sent back to Canada.235  A key difference 
between this case of shell shock and others is that there is no explanation of the accident, 
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and no discussion of neurasthenic symptoms despite a diagnosis as such. Despite not 
leaving service until 1919, he was granted leave to Canada on 23 June 1916, less than a 
month after presenting with shell shock to the Anglo-American Hospital in Boulogne. 
Massey was sent to Yale University to help train officers on the home front. Two years 
later, he was sent back to the war front, but this time to Siberia (on 26 October 1918) with 
the ammunition column. He was struck off strength on return to Canada on 21 April 
1919.236 Massey would return to the military for the Second World War as a major in the 
adjutant general’s branch in 1942.237 The following year he would be invalided back to 
Canada. He went on to become a prominent Canadian actor, earning two stars on the 
Hollywood Walk of Fame.238 His leave from the front was quick and reflective of a 
military priority that showed preference towards rank as opposed to medical needs. 
3.3 Case Study #3: Private Allen Robertson Darby and Private 
Charles Stevens. 
This final section explores the story of a soldier who should not necessarily be 
part of this study as he was not discharged as mentally or medically unfit. However, his 
case file raises an important element of the experience of the shell shock: the pretend 
patient. One of the biggest driving forces behind the attempt to rein in the liberal use of 
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the diagnosis of shell shock, aside from needing hospital space and to maintain military 
strength at the front, was that a number of the soldiers presenting with shell shock to field 
ambulances and convalescent stations were thought to be faking their illness as a way to 
get away from the front. Because shell shock symptoms were so varied and inconsistent, 
the incidence of soldiers thought to be lying about having shell shock was apparently 
steadily growing. Officially, these men were called malingerers, people who feigned or 
exaggerated an illness as a means of avoiding their duty as soldiers. Historian Ben 
Shepherd discusses the presence of malingerers as becoming problematic by 1917 for the 
Canadian and British armies. At that point, a prominent trend was noticed in soldiers who 
were close to being discharged from hospitals: they were experiencing sudden onset 
hysterical episodes.239 The result would be a longer hospital stay and more time off duty 
and away from the front. This had multiple impacts through the medical and military 
systems.  First, malingerers took up hospital space that could be used for newly more 
severely affected soldiers. A lack of space to treat patients would necessitate the creation 
of more convalescent centres. Second, Shepherd discusses the influence of malingerers 
on medicine itself. As soldiers presented with spontaneous hysterical episodes, 
neurologists and psychologists had to figure out how best to treat them. If neurological 
treatments were not going to work on a patient, psychologists would take over, 
employing treatments based on convincing patients that they were not actually sick or 
could be cured with relative ease. Physicians would start to use electricity as a way to 
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show the patient that their symptoms were not physical but mental and to “reawaken [the 
soldier’s] sense of patriotism and masculine self-respect.”240  
In another effort to cope with men who might be feigning shell shock to escape 
from the front or shirk duties, hospitals had tiered and tailored admission processes based 
on the severity of affliction, illness, injury, or disease. As explored in the treatment 
chapter, No. 7 Queen’s Hospital would identify patients based on illness type and then 
severity. The type of illness would determine the wing they were sent to - chest patients 
together, tuberculosis patients together, mental health patients together - and then the 
severity of their case would determine if the patient needed immediate treatment or if he 
just needed some rest.241 The war diaries for Queen’s indicate that most of those who 
were admitted for nervous or shock-related illnesses just needed clean clothes, a shower, 
some food, and rest. Hospitals made it part of the admission procedure to account for 
men who were not sick, or at least required no specialized treatment. 
There were frequent cases where soldiers were brought in for shell shock and then 
their diagnosis altered as their symptoms did. However, discerning the shifting diagnosis 
from the malingerer is difficult. One case where the malingering is more clearly 
expressed is Private Allen Robertson Darby. Pte Darby was a 21-year-old machinist and 
carpet-stretcher from Toronto, Ontario. On 17 August 1915, he was examined in Toronto 
and approved to be enlisted to the 35th Battalion. On 15 April 1916 Pte Darby was 
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admitted to No. 3 Canadian Field Ambulance in Belgium for shell shock, staying ten days 
before being discharged back to his unit. On 3 June 1916 Pte Darby was admitted to No. 
2 Canadian Field Ambulance for shell shock; he stayed for eleven days before being 
discharged back to his unit.242 There is no medical history case sheet to document his 
stay at either of these field ambulances or to indicate what symptoms brought him in, his 
condition, or why he was discharged instead of transferred. In February, Pte Darby again 
returned to hospital, but this time was just simply listed as sick. Again, there were no 
forms to specify the type of sickness or the incident that brought him in. On 9 March 
1917 Pte Darby received an appendectomy and 30 March 1917 he was well enough to be 
transferred to the Canadian Convalescent Hospital in Monks Horton.  On 20 May 1917, 
as a result of having surgery, Pte Darby was up for a medical board review to determine 
whether he would be discharged home, remain in hospital, or be sent out to a command 
depot and ultimately return to the front or light duties. According to the record, he “states 
that his bowels never moved without having an enema till about four weeks ago. Is 
troubled with constipation at present time. Is using purgatives. Looks to be in good 
condition. This man does not tell an honest story.”243 In this case study, soldiers accused 
of misconstruing the facts were diagnosed with other mental afflictions that helped to 
explain why they might be misremembering or lying about something. Poor mental 
acuity, hallucinations, melancholic behaviour, hysteria, early onset dementia, psychic 
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disturbances, and even “queer actions” are a few of the terms used to help explain the 
mental state of different soldiers. In the case of Pte Darby, no explanation is given even 
by the medical board personnel. On 21 May 1917, he was discharged from Monks Horton 
to as a category AIII and was destined for the reserve unit. On 26 March 1919 Pte Darby 
received a medical examination, standard for soldiers leaving the service who had no 
disability; his physique, nutrition, pulse, arteries, vision, hearing, and all-around general 
health were considered good. In the section that asks physicians to describe what systems 
were affected by the war, “digestive” and “nervous” were listed.244 From 15 April 1916 
to 14 June 1916, he was diagnosed with shell shock but considered “recovered.” From 27 
February 1917 to 21 May 1917, he was diagnosed with appendicitis and was also 
considered “recovered” from that illness.245 4 April 1919 is the date of his discharge at 
the No. 2 District Depot in Toronto. He was 24 years old at this point and had been 
transferred from the 35th to the 4th Canadian Infantry Battalion. He was discharged on 
demobilization and not for any medical or mental health reasons.246 
Shepherd mentions that physicians had a difficult time diagnosing the malingerer 
from the affected patient and some physicians even admitted that the line between the 
two groups was arbitrary and ultimately had to be approached on a case-by-case basis.247 
As a comparison to Pte Darby, Private Charles Stevens was 24-year-old London, 
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England-born chimney sweep who enlisted on 13 December 1915 into the 72nd Canadian 
Infantry Battalion. On 27 April 1917 he was admitted to No. 4 Stationary Hospital in 
Arques for “NYD Shell Shock.”248 Ten days later he was transferred to No 2 General 
Hospital in Havre for Neurasthenia, and on 23 May was transferred again to the 2nd 
Western General Hospital in Manchester for Neurasthenia. On 2 June 1917 physicians 
noted that the patient had a hysterical fit that lasted five minutes after when “falling, 
struck his occipital against a stone.”249 On 15 June he was transferred to the Canadian 
Convalescent Hospital in Woodcote Park, Epsom, for Neurasthenia. On 29 June he was 
discharged, but on 21 July he was admitted to the Canadian Convalescent Hospital in 
Eastbourne for mental observation due to hysteria. Stevens was in hospital for 71 days 
before being boarded for return to Canada.  In each case, his condition was documented 
and changed accordingly. When he started presenting hysterical symptoms, family 
history was delved into as a potential explanation. Physicians found out that his father 
had in fact died in an asylum and that his sister was a known invalid.250 While the fall 
could have caused his seizures, it was not posited as a possibility but his family history 
with asylums was touted as the cause for his hysteria and fits. In the case of Pte Darby, no 
investigation was done into his present or past conditions. Physicians and hospital 
personnel did not even fill out a medical history case sheet for his shell shock visit. With 
Pte. Stevens his case was still explored medically, and he was eventually discharged for 
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being medically unfit. The biggest difference between these two men’s case files was that 
Pte Stevens, despite a known history of alcoholism and family history of invalidism, was 
still considered to have good character and was therefore worthy of medical treatment. 
Conclusion: 
The soldiers analyzed in this chapter were selected from a study of fifty men 
discharged from the CEF for being mentally unfit at some point over the course of the 
First World War. These men’s experiences provide microcosms to examine what it meant 
on the ground for men to be diagnosed with shell shock and what it meant to be 
diagnosed with neurasthenia. Pte Bailey and Pte Essery’s files demonstrate that shell 
shock was not always a permanent disability or mental illness, even though it could affect 
you permanently. How physicians recorded that and tracked that progression out of shell 
shock to neurasthenia was arbitrary and served a military war machine that required men 
out of hospitals and back on the front lines to maintain unit strength. Both men were 
shifted from a diagnosis of shell shock to neurasthenia as their symptoms shifted away 
from purely neurological. This was not an uncommon occurrence, and at least 20% of the 
soldiers in this study would bounce between these two diagnoses at least once. 
Rank was important factor that affected how a soldier was treated in the First 
World War. Lieut Massey’s family was well connected and his rank allowed him 
privileges. His treatments were better recorded and followed up on, he was able to see a 
doctor who worked for the royal family, and when he lost faith in his ability to perform 
his duties he was sent home to work with other officers at Yale to help train them for a 
few years. Most men, when sent home, did not have the option to return let alone the 
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option to remain in the army. If a soldier was sent back to Canada by reason of mental 
unfitness, it was because they could no longer be of service to the military. Officers and 
men in convalescent camps were offered different treatments and had access to different 
facilities that were outfitted with different equipment and physicians. One’s treatment 
was strongly influenced by one’s rank in the First World War. 
Malingering has been an issue with armies as long as they have existed. Shirking 
duties and trying to get out of war is what obedience training works against. In the First 
World War, malingering was thought to be rife in hospital cases, specifically in mental 
health cases. In this case study, only one soldier could be identified as potentially 
malingering. His hospital case sheets were not filled out, his medical history was not 
explored, and treatment was limited. The only explanation for this arose in a medical 
board analysis of his case in which someone indicated that “this man does not tell an 
honest story.”251 Again, no explanation was offered, but in case files that usually explore 
a patient’s complaints and comment on the quality of his character as a soldier, the lack 
of these two things indicate that he was considered to be a malingerer. Because this study 
focused on analyzing files that were discharged for being mentally unfit, isolating files 
that described malingerers was difficult.  
A multitude of forces outside the soldier’s individual health affected how they 
were diagnosed and treated. Military needs determined where they would go for 
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treatment, and how long they would be there. Physicians determined how their patients 
would be treated according to their training and practices. Officers and men were exposed 
to different levels of care. With all these factors at play in the CAMC during the First 
World War, the health care they provided could not be standardized. 
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4 Conclusion. 
The First World War saw the advent, advancement, and application of new 
medicines, sciences, and technologies. While the term shell shock came into being during 
the First World War to describe men who had seemingly been mentally affected by shell 
explosions happening around them, psychological conditions brought on by the stresses 
associated with war, or war neuroses, were not a new category of disease. Physicians had 
been working with the insane, the hysterical, those of irritable heart, and the neurasthenic 
long before 1914. What the First World War changed about war neuroses was that it 
generated such a large number of psychological casualties as to threaten unit strength and 
to call into question contemporary notions of masculinity, sanity, and class. The field of 
psychology was able to expand its foothold in the world of medicine and academics due 
to the   massive numbers of psychological casualties demanding treatment that 
traditional, physiologically-oriented physicians could not alone address. As the war 
progressed and these fields of medicine opposed each other on how exactly to classify 
and treat shell shock, conflict emerged between them, with psychologists wanting to 
secure their place as a valued specialty and neurologists defending their expertise on 
nervous disorders and the brain. In addition to this conflict, these physicians had to 
operate cohesively under the umbrella of the Canadian military to establish acceptable 
procedures and treatments that could be applied to all wounded soldiers. Yet war 
propelled all fields of inquiry forward at such a staggering pace that to expect a 
standardized mode of operation was improbable.  
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Psychology and neurology, two prominent fields of medicine, were both plagued 
by disagreements and disputes over what mental health was, how to treat shell shock, and 
how to distinguish a nervous, physiological disorder from a psychological one. 
Neurology was an older field of medicine based on physical evidence of medical 
pathology; in treating shell shock, neurologists would take functional neurological 
approaches and try to assess if there were physical lesions present on nervous tissue. 
They were more likely to employ electrotherapeutic treatments on shell shock and other 
neurologically afflicted patients. However, like most other physicians, neurologists were 
at a loss in explaining how to specifically treat shell shock and neurasthenia. Nerve pain 
and exhaustion could be treated with analgesics and sleep aids. To cure the shakiness and 
the tremors, outside of convalescence, neurologists looked to older treatments like 
electrotherapeutics to reset the body’s nervous energy in non-responsive or poorly 
responsive muscles. Having been employed as a means of keeping paralyzed muscles 
active, Faradism and Galvanism were employed as ways to combat uncontrollable 
actions. Neurologists experienced some success with these techniques, but most soldiers 
would return to hospital with a resurgence of tremors; it was, at the very most, a short-
term solution. Psychologists offered a different perspective; while physical symptoms 
directed their investigations, they were focused on the mentality of their patients. 
Different types of psychologists put greater weight on other matters of importance: what 
soldiers’ level of intelligence was, how their standard behaviours could be indicative of 
weak or poor mental abilities, what they were dreaming about, and how they perceived 
their illnesses. Assessing the mental status of the patient would help inform the physician 
about the origins of their patient’s illness. Was it brought on from the war? Why? Does 
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their family history explain some hereditary mental weakness that predisposed them to a 
mental breakdown? All these questions and more directed multiple physicians’ inquiries 
into the origins of and, ideally, the cure for shell shock. Fear became a central 
psychological point upon which  the psychologist focused, often using coercive, 
hypnotic, and sometimes electrical means to convince patients that they were going to get 
better – or, in the case of the electrical stimuli, also to convince patients to stop 
malingering and return to the front. Electrotherapy, an old treatment but one that the 
public still poorly understood, was a startling technique and its instruments as well as the 
fact that it employed electricity was as much about intimidation as it was a muscular 
therapeutic tool. Physicians could agree that if a soldier was expressing nervous 
symptoms like shaking, tremors, or even an inability to move, he would receive 
electrotherapeutic treatments in the form of Faradism or Galvanism, alongside ionization 
baths, massages, and other relaxing convalescent treatments if their conditions permitted, 
in an attempt to correct the nervous energy in these men. Underlining all these different 
treatments and convalescent diversions that physicians had at their disposal for a patient 
was military need. Would the patient benefit from treatment to the extent that they could 
be rehabilitated? The goals of the medical community were undercut by the need to 
conserve manpower; what that meant for treatment was efficiency over efficacy.  
The prioritizing of military efficiency over medical efficacy can be seen in war 
diaries as well as the case files. Prior to major military operations, men in hospitals who 
could be moved were ushered into command depots and convalescent hospitals to begin 
their army training again and get them back to the front. Space had to be made for new 
wounded and injured men; if a soldier appeared to be on the mend, he was taking up 
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triage space. Military efficiency over individual care and medical preference also 
emerged in the diagnostic process of treatment. As dramatic numbers of soldiers were 
being sent to England, and home, with shell shock, the army restricted use of the term 
only to those soldiers who had been involved in a shell explosion; even then, only 
physicians in hospitals could diagnose a soldier with shell shock. Convalescent hospitals, 
field ambulances, and rest stations could only assess and send a soldier back to a hospital 
if his condition was serious enough to require specialized treatment for shell shock. It 
became hospital protocol to give stable soldiers presenting with shell shock symptoms 
rest and relaxation their first night, as opposed to any specialized treatment, because it 
was assumed that most soldiers just needed a rest or were malingering.  
Rank and classism also affected how a soldier with psychological afflictions was 
treated. Officers had specialized hospitals and convalescent homes designed for smaller, 
more manageable numbers of patients. Officers were also offered more specialized 
treatments like Faradism and Galvanism more frequently; in this case study, 
electrotherapeutic methods as treatments were only mentioned in officers’ files. Men may 
have received electrotherapeutic treatments at the hospitals and convalescent homes, but 
their physicians did not record it in their files. How class operated to affect the treatment 
of soldiers was not in that it guaranteed officers better treatment, but that they were given 
more opportunities to improve their health. Specialized convalescent homes and officer-
only events at hospitals resulted in better individualized care for officers suffering from 
psychological issues. Men and non-commissioned officers were subject to the same types 
of treatment, but because of rank they were more likely to be sent straight back the front 
if presenting with psychological issues. This was done to maintain the health of the 
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officers so as to maintain hierarchical organization of the military but also to maintain 
morale amongst the men; having officers who did not believe in their abilities did not 
engender obedience, strength, or success.  Some physicians treated soldiers differently 
depending on their class and rank. Intelligence and education affected how a man was 
treated by his officers; if an officer felt that communication was impeded, there is 
evidence of physicians feeling disinclined to connect with men. While Canada believed 
itself a classless army, upper-class Canadians had strong upper-class British connections 
and the CAMC operated under the RAMC; both realities resulted in one class being 
treated better than another for the same or similar illnesses. If class and rank brought 
about different treatments and treatment levels, the CAMC could not have been offering 
its soldiers standardized medical practice. 
My approach to the study of shell shock in this thesis has been to take the 
macrocosmic perspectives of other historians and apply them to individual case studies as 
a means of testing the validity of their research on the ground. In 2018 historian Mark 
Osborne Humphries released his book A Weary Road, an exploration of shell shock as it 
was experienced by the members of the Canadian Expeditionary Forces. In it, he argues 
that  
Until the creation of the special hospitals after the Battle of the Somme, most 
cases of nervous illness evacuated from the front were sent to non-specialist base 
hospitals along the coast. The creation of a network of army-level hospitals, 
which began in December 1916 and continued throughout the winter of 1917, 
initiated a process of standardization which ultimately proved the be 
successful.252  
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He goes on to say in his conclusion that the creation of specialized hospitals to treat shell 
shocked and other psychologically injured soldiers was an organic process that resulted in 
“the standardization of distinct diagnostic and treatment models at those hospitals.”253 
These quotes struck me as an interesting starting point; could it be said that the processes 
and procedures instituted and implemented by the CAMC during the First World War 
were standardized? Were diagnoses and treatment equally applied to all soldiers at all 
hospitals? In the early stages of my research, I noticed that while the military was trying 
to streamline and make more efficient its medical practices for treating soldiers and 
sending them back from the front, those methods were more accurately described as 
broadly generalized practices rather than standardized ones. Restricting the use of the 
term shell shock, while permitting different medical specializations to operate on their 
own definitions of shell shock, was not standardization. Military hospitals employed 
electrotherapy, dream therapy, hypnosis, psychotherapy, and massage. Permitting officers 
to receive longer care in hospitals and at home, more specialized treatments, and access 
to different convalescent activities than other ranks is not standardization; it was tiered, 
generalized care that was, again, given at the discretion of the physicians treating these 
officers. Adding this historical lens to an analysis of First World War medicine will 
permit more practical understandings of the experiences of the men and connect the 
microcosm of the individual experience to the macrocosm of the institutions waging war 
in Europe. 
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This case study explored the experiences of First World War Canadian soldiers at 
the front to determine if information in their medical case files corresponds to larger 
historical ideas about medical progress during the war. The concept that as the war 
progressed, medical diagnostics and treatment of soldiers with psychological issues 
became standardized glosses over the evolution of medicine and ignores the experiences 
of men on the ground. These case studies, alongside war diaries and medical books 
published during and after the First World War, offer evidence of what it meant to be 
involved in an evolving medical practice, not a standardized one.  
In conducting research for this thesis, I noticed some inherent restrictions in my 
methodology that could inspire different case study projects. This study aimed to find a 
randomized sampling of soldier who were rendered mentally unfit at different points in 
the war (to create a broader understanding of their experience), but its opposite could be 
pursued. Case studies could be done on each year, during periods around major 
engagements, to provide a sampling of men exposed to similar conditions. It would be 
possible to explore the variations within this subset of individuals to determine if there 
was a shared reaction to a shared experience, and to examine how the medical 
community diagnosed and treated these individuals differently. Performing more case 
studies to amass statistically relevant data would help to test theories, and either reaffirm 
them or call them into question. 
Exploring fifty case files of soldiers discharged for being medically unfit allowed 
this thesis to discuss the concept of standardization within military medical institutions. It 
revealed that because of intellectual, medical, military, and classist biases held by the 
medical and military communities, health care was unevenly distributed. In a medical 
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military system that supported treating ranked officers and men differently, permitted 
neurologists and psychologists to treat shell shocked and other psychologically affected 
soldiers differently, and prioritized military goals over the health of its soldiers was a 
system based on reactive generalized strategies as opposed to a standardized system of 
health care. 
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Appendix A. 
The fifty soldiers’ names and regimental numbers used in this case study can be 
found in the table below. The regimental numbers and item numbers can be used to 
search the Library and Archives Canada Website where all their digitized First World 
War Canadian service records can be found. 
 
Soldier Regimental 
Number 
Link 
 
Roderick 
Lebreton 
666630 
http://central.bac-
lac.gc.ca/.item/?op=pdf&app=CEF&id=B5506-S022 
Herbert Swaine 59942 
http://central.bac-
lac.gc.ca/.item/?op=pdf&app=CEF&id=B9448-S036 
Hugh Boyd 348395 
http://central.bac-
lac.gc.ca/.item/?op=pdf&app=CEF&id=B0974-S012 
Philip 
Luckoshanko 
105255 
http://central.bac-
lac.gc.ca/.item/?op=pdf&app=CEF&id=B5786-S021 
Jacquet Joe 51239 
http://central.bac-
lac.gc.ca/.item/?op=pdf&app=CEF&id=B4841-S020 
Lawrence McKay 165834 
http://central.bac-
lac.gc.ca/.item/?op=pdf&app=CEF&id=B6933-S035 
William Ingram 
Thompson 
15440 
http://central.bac-
lac.gc.ca/.item/?op=pdf&app=CEF&id=B9665-S039 
Ernest Fraser 502820 
http://central.bac-
lac.gc.ca/.item/?op=pdf&app=CEF&id=B3279-S026 
James Jackson 2762 
http://central.bac-
lac.gc.ca/.item/?op=pdf&app=CEF&id=B4748-S031 
Fred G. Bailey 
21796 
http://central.bac-
lac.gc.ca/.item/?op=pdf&app=CEF&id=B0344-S001 
 
Wilfred A. 
Holloway 
- http://central.bac-
lac.gc.ca/.item/?op=pdf&app=CEF&id=B4451-S017 
Raymond Hart 
Massey 
- https://central.bac-
lac.gc.ca/.item/?op=pdf&app=CEF&id=6020-11 
Frederick A. 
Gates 
- 
https://central.bac-
lac.gc.ca/.item/?op=pdf&app=CEF&id=B3438-S045 
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Gerald O'Grady - 
http://central.bac-
lac.gc.ca/.item/?op=pdf&app=CEF&id=B7432-S030 
Walter James 
Barr 
- http://central.bac-
lac.gc.ca/.item/?op=pdf&app=CEF&id=B0460-S010 
Lewis Earl 
Thomson 
648890 
http://central.bac-
lac.gc.ca/.item/?op=pdf&app=CEF&id=B9650-S045 
 
Herbert Edwin 
Osborne 
648690 
http://central.bac-
lac.gc.ca/.item/?op=pdf&app=CEF&id=B7495-S011 
 
James Coulthard 
451204 
http://central.bac-
lac.gc.ca/.item/?op=pdf&app=CEF&id=B2047-S014 
 
Silas Miller 
404895 
http://central.bac-
lac.gc.ca/.item/?op=pdf&app=CEF&id=B6196-S055 
 
Herbert Graham 
Starr 
- 
http://central.bac-
lac.gc.ca/.item/?op=pdf&app=CEF&id=B9245-S015 
Charles 
Alexander 
Fallaize 
192492 https://central.bac-
lac.gc.ca/.item/?op=pdf&app=CEF&id=B2986-S005 
Frederick Binns 464585 
http://central.bac-
lac.gc.ca/.item/?op=pdf&app=CEF&id=B0739-S003 
Stanley H Cooper 79822 
http://central.bac-
lac.gc.ca/.item/?op=pdf&app=CEF&id=B1977-S046 
Ernest Lawson 440870 
http://central.bac-
lac.gc.ca/.item/?op=pdf&app=CEF&id=B5468-S060 
John Waters 703509 
http://central.bac-
lac.gc.ca/.item/?op=pdf&app=CEF&id=B10120-S012 
Ernest George 
Warman 
428802 http://central.bac-
lac.gc.ca/.item/?op=pdf&app=CEF&id=B10097-S014 
Gerasim Stecenko 448219 
http://central.bac-
lac.gc.ca/.item/?op=pdf&app=CEF&id=B9251-S014 
James Ritchie 29620 
http://central.bac-
lac.gc.ca/.item/?op=pdf&app=CEF&id=B8301-S009 
Edward S Brooke 441865 
http://central.bac-
lac.gc.ca/.item/?op=pdf&app=CEF&id=B1097-S011 
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George Augustus 
Fisher 
602866 http://central.bac-
lac.gc.ca/.item/?op=pdf&app=CEF&id=B3106-S016 
Stephen Osbourne 
Harvey 
184152 
http://central.bac-
lac.gc.ca/.item/?op=pdf&app=CEF&id=B4138A-S059 
William Wickert 874573 
http://central.bac-
lac.gc.ca/.item/?op=pdf&app=CEF&id=B10339-S013 
Abram Funk 288151 
http://central.bac-
lac.gc.ca/.item/?op=pdf&app=CEF&id=B3339-S001 
James Salmond - 
http://central.bac-
lac.gc.ca/.item/?op=pdf&app=CEF&id=B8618-S002 
Daniel Young 68263 
https://central.bac-
lac.gc.ca/.item/?op=pdf&app=CEF&id=B10646-S036 
Richard Edge 142470 
http://central.bac-
lac.gc.ca/.item/?op=pdf&app=CEF&id=B2824-S041 
Thomas Essery 772866 
http://central.bac-
lac.gc.ca/.item/?op=pdf&app=CEF&id=B2930-S050 
E. L. Baker 733360 
http://central.bac-
lac.gc.ca/.item/?op=pdf&app=CEF&id=B0367-S045 
Charles Leslie 
Mosher 
2700740 
http://central.bac-
lac.gc.ca/.item/?op=pdf&app=CEF&id=B6434-S017 
Cyril Cedric 
Hughes 
472417 
http://central.bac-
lac.gc.ca/.item/?op=pdf&app=CEF&id=B4588-S009 
John Dyce 24474 
http://central.bac-
lac.gc.ca/.item/?op=pdf&app=CEF&id=B2787-S053 
Vincent Maxted 71978 
http://central.bac-
lac.gc.ca/.item/?op=pdf&app=CEF&id=B6061-S006 
George Swanson 775965 
http://central.bac-
lac.gc.ca/.item/?op=pdf&app=CEF&id=B9455-S001 
William Cady 696750 
http://central.bac-
lac.gc.ca/.item/?op=pdf&app=CEF&id=B1371-S028 
Thomas Moore 443868 
http://central.bac-
lac.gc.ca/.item/?op=pdf&app=CEF&id=B6337A-S059 
Frederick Charles 
Ernest Arnold 
17093 
http://central.bac-
lac.gc.ca/.item/?op=pdf&app=CEF&id=B0243-S004 
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David Denholm 472299 
http://central.bac-
lac.gc.ca/.item/?op=pdf&app=CEF&id=B2437-S034 
Charles Struthers 2204168 
http://central.bac-
lac.gc.ca/.item/?op=pdf&app=CEF&id=B9391-S045 
Charles Stevens 472815 
http://central.bac-
lac.gc.ca/.item/?op=pdf&app=CEF&id=B9283-S005 
Allen Robertson 
Darby 
405237 
http://central.bac-
lac.gc.ca/.item/?op=pdf&app=CEF&id=B2292-S068 
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